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Abstract

. his is a study of humankind from the perspectives
of a representative from psychology, the psychoanalytic
British object-relations physician and psychoanalyst,
William Ronald Dodds Fairbairn, M.D.

(1889 to 1965), and

from theology, the Western Orthodox Christian Dominican
theologian and Doctor of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas,
O.P.

(Order of Preachers)

(1225 to 1274).

These theorist/practitioners share a common
scientific and philosophical method dedicated to the
discovery of reality under God.

Each believed that a

person's nature is relationally based.

Both believed

that the person is a psyche and soma, a psychological
and biological, unity.

Each believed that turning from

real relationship and turning to less real relationship
is against the nature of the person, separating the

iv

person frbm reality, splitting one in one's devotion,
and thus causing detrimental psychological, or
spiritual, consequences.
This author asserts that the concept of
relationship is the key to a psychoanalytic objectrelations theoretical and Thomistic theological
understanding of the human personality.

It also posits

that this concept of relationship may serve as an
integration point between psychology and theology.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Focus

Broad Focus
The study of humankind is undertaken by various
disciplines such as medicine, nursing, sociology,
psychology, and theology.
helpful perspective.

Each has a different and

Taken together, these fields

offer a wide perspective.

Put together, these field

are powerful resources for explaining and improving
human life.

It seems natural to compare and contrast

views from distinct areas of study to augment and
synergize findings.

A goal of this paper is to show

the inherent congruity of psychology and theology and
the efficacy each holds toward explaining human
living.
A cry is heard from the field of psychology to
return to scientific standards of practice.
psychology has no standards of practice.

"Clinical
How is
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competence to be judged in the absence of standards?
In the meantime, enthusiasm for licensure,
designation, and other professionally competitive
maneuvers continues unabated" (Sechrest, 1992, p.
682).

Defining what is scientific and what is not is

fundamental to this task.

Needed are scientifically

strong clinicians, experimenters, and theoreticians.
But also fundamental are the assumptions and the
logical methodology employed.

For this, sound

philosophical minds are needed.
Howard (1985) believes that to build a science of
psychology,

values are crucial.

Commenting on

Mahatma Ghandi's statement that one of the seven sins
of the world is "science without humanity," Howard
heralds the call to "construct a science of humans
built upon an image of humanity that reflects and
reveres human nature in all its diversity, complexity,
and subtlety" (p. 264).

Those professing a religious

world view have special reason to pursue with
integrity a value based science of psychology.
This paper is an investigation of one
representative from the world of psychology and one
from that of theology.

Represented are two men who,

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations
3

in some measure, met the challenge of Sechrest and
Howard.

One was a rigorous clinical and theoretical

scientist with sound philosophical and theological
training.

The other was a theologian whose

philosophical mind and dedication to empirical reality
is unsurpassed.

One was a psychiatrist of the 20th

century.

The other was a theologian of the 13th

century.

If commonalities exist between this pair

separated by seven centuries, all the more timeless
the truths would prove to be.

Narrower Focus
For this paper the focus in the area of
psychology is clinical psychology and the focus in
theology is Christianity.

Further, the spotlight is

narrowed within psychology to psychoanalytic British
object-relations theory and within theology to Western
Orthodox Christianity.

The following figure may

clarify these domains and subclassifications.

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations
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Figure 1.

Focus of the paper.

Psychology

Theology

Clinical Psychology

Christianity

Psychoanalysis

Western Tradition

British Object-Relations

Western Orthodoxy

W. R. D. Fairbairn

Thomas Aquinas

As representative of psychoanalytic British
object-relations theory, the subject is the Scottish
physician and psychoanalyst, William Ronald Dodds
Fairbairn, M.D.

(1889 to 1965) .1

As representative of

Western Orthodox Christianity, the choice is the
Italian Dominican theologian and Doctor of the Church,
St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P.
1274).

(Order of Preachers)

(1225 to

Each was a foundational theorist, who, though

standing on the shoulders of great minds, Freud for

lrn this paper, Fairbairn's spelling of the term
"object-relations," which he coined, is retained
instead of the North American spelling which is
without the hyphen.
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for Fairbairn and Aristotle and the Church Fathers for
Aquinas, themselves advanced their discipline to such
a degree that their work has laid a firm foundation
upon which current thinkers continue to build.
It is posited here that a careful reading and
analysis of the work of

w.

R. D. Fairbairn, paired

with an examination of the data of Thomistic theology,
will bring to light the significance each holds for
the other.

Fairbairn's theory has particular

application for psychodynamic therapists professing a
religious, and especially a Christian, world view.
Aquinas' works have been the cornerstone of much
Christian thinking throughout the ages.

Method

Integration
Attempts at integrating theology and psychology
can be hampered by a lack of conceptualization
regarding how this should be accomplished.

Much of

the disagreement and confusion swirl around methods
and data far out on the practical end of the spectrum.
Because these practical theological and psychological
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considerations are derived from theory, they include
within themselves any inconsistencies that existed in
their theoretical foundations.
This is the reason for the journey back to some
of the foundations of psychoanalytic object-relations
theory and Western Orthodox Christian theology.
Successful work here would have the effect of opening
the door to further integration at the philosophical
level, the result being a greater congeniality between
these domains.

Scope
This paper is written for those interested in the
theory and practice of psychology, particularly
clinicians.

There is an attempt to put theological

concepts in "user friendly" terms.

This is not a

systematic rendering of these men's works but a
topical exposition of key issues.

Yet it is intended

to be true to the meaning of the authors cited.

It is

written, not by an expert in, but by an admirer and
devotee of psychoanalytic British object-relations and
Thomistic thinking.

The paper is not the tight

formulation of a new integrative paradigm but a
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dialogical foundation for further work toward that
end.

It is not meant as the last word, but as an

introduction.

It is not a destination point, but a

point of departure.
This work attempts to represent the actual
positions of Fairbairn and Aquinas.

There is no

concentrated attempt at proving their ideas, though
this author supports their veracity in the main, but
only at presenting them accurately and clearly.

There

is, however, an attempt to show the parallels between
the thinking of Fairbairn and Aquinas.
The remainder of this chapter discusses reasons
for the selection of Fairbairn and Aquinas as
representatives of psychology and theology
respectively.

It then puts forth the thesis, with

necessary definitions, and outlines the structure of
the paper.
WhY Fairbairn?
Five reasons may be given explaining the
motivation to present Fairbairn's theory in
particular.

First, of all the models in existence,

Fairbairn's is arguably one of the clearest and purest
expression of the shift from the Freudian drive model
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to a relational model (Mitchell, 1988, p. 2;
Sutherland, 1989, p. 162).

Second, until recently,

his work has been overlooked in the psychoanalytic
community due to the difficulty in extracting theory
from his papers and the perceived closeness of his
work with that of Melanie Klein.
A third reason for making Fairbairn's theory the
focus of the first part of this study is his exposure
and adherence to Christianity.

A fourth reason is the

influence of Fairbairn's theory upon present
psychoanalytic theorists.

Sutherland made the

following remarkable claim.
[Fairbairn] was the first to propose in a
systematic manner the Copernican change of
founding the psychoanalytic theory of human
personality on the experiences within social
relationships instead of on the discharge of
instinctual tensions originating solely within
the individual.

(p. 162)

In expanding object-relations of the individual
to couple and family therapy,

David and Jill Scharff

(1991) of the Washington School of Psychiatry pay
homage to Fairbairn, setting much of the theoretical
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base of their work upon the foundation of his original
writings.

Stephen Mitchell, Greenberg's co-author

(1983), has written a 1988 volume that references
Fairbairn extensively.

Seinfeld's newly released book

(1991) is described by Eigen in this way:

"What is

especially important is his emphasis on Fairbairn,
whose work has not received the attention it deserves
in this country.

.

I have long felt the neglect of

Fairbairn has left a hole in my understanding of many
clinical problems . . . " (Eigen, 1991, pp. 4, 5).
Finally, Fairbairn's work is striking in its
anticipation.

Current infant research has served to

confirm a great many of Fairbairn's observations.

In

fact, two decades before Mahler's landmark infant
studies (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975),

Fairbairn

was calling attention to the importance of the early
dyadic relationship.

The work of Stern (1985) has

also tended to reinforce the prescient aspect of
Fairbairn's insights.

WhY AQuinas?
Aquinas' work is of an immense intellectual
force.

He is credited with having written over 90

works, of which many were in multiple volumes.

Few
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theologians have been more dedicated to the
application of philosophical principles to the arena
of Christian faith, to the melding of faith and
reason, than he.

Commonweal has said that the

partnership of faith and reason is the very heart and
soul of Aquinas' writings, and his work on this issue
is a "challenge to eradicate prejudice in favor of
argument, an opportunity to discover the indissoluable
partnership of the two"

(Gilson, 1963, p. 386).

As

such, his work has been chosen here, first, because of
his monumental intellectual effort in the area of
subjective and objective reality, of sacred and
secular, of faith and science.
In his work, The Intellectual Life, the Dominican
A. G. Sertillanges has said, "The Church believes
today, as she believed from the first, that Thomism is
an ark of salvation, capable of keeping minds afloat
in the deluge of doctrine"

(Aquinas, 1981, foreword) .

In great measure, Western Christianity has been built
on the foundation Aquinas has laid.

Though by no

means representing a view homogeneous to Western
Christianity or Roman Catholicism, he is nonetheless a
standard by which subsequent theologies are compared.
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Orthodox Protestants are also reclaiming alignment
with Aquinas as the prejudice against him, borne out
of reformation enmity, has diminished (Geisler, 1975,
p. 192)).

A second reason Aquinas' work has been

chosen here, then, is because it represents a large
and weighty segment of history and thought in the
Western Orthodox Christian tradition.
The third reason St. Thomas was chosen is because
of his intense work on the psychology of humankind.
Gardeil (1959) has written an entire work devoted to
Thomistic psychology.

Much contemporary thought

concerning the science and philosophy of human being
is based on Aquinas' solid concepts.

Agreed or

opposed, all who deal in the subject of psychology are
forced to grapple with the very same issues he did.
WhY Fairbairn and Aquinas?
The reason for including Aquinas in a comparison
with Fairbairn is the commonality each has with the
other.

This is covered more fully in chapter four.

These men were not only theorists but practitioners.
Fairbairn and Aquinas both introduced a Copernicanlike change to their discipline while holding firm to
the traditional foundations.

Each provided a
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foundation upon which others have built.

Each was

passionately dedicated to the lifelong pursuit of
truth as expressed in reality.

Each integrated sacred

and secular fields of study and applied it to his
particular discipline.
Thesis
The proposition for consideration in this paper
is that there is a most important commonality between
these two men.

The essential theme within Fairbairn's

psychoanalytic object-relations theory, the primacy of
relationship, is an already embedded thematic within
Christian theology as espoused by Aquinas.

In

essence, the task is to expose a pre-existing state of
affairs.
This dissertation asserts that the concept of
relationship is the key to a psychoanalytic objectrelations theoretical and Thomistic theological
understanding of the human personality.

Second, that

this concept of relationship may serve as an
integration point between psychology and theology.
But before this can be further elucidated, a
definition of terms is necessary.
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Human relationship is the irreducible minimum,
necessary basis, most fundamental need, the sine qua
non of human existence.

It gives ultimate meaning and

supreme value to human life.

Relationship is the

primary motivation for human living.

Fairbairn said

that relationship is the significance of human living
and that "psychology may be said to resolve itself
into a study of the relationships of the individual to
his objects . . . " (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60).

Aquinas

has said, "man's perfect good is that he somehow know
God." (Aquinas, 1975b, p. 35; Aquinas, 1981, p.583;
Gardeil, 1959, p. vii).
Definition.

"Relationship" is defined as "the

state or character of being related or interrelated:
connection, as in 'show the relationship between two
things'"

(Webster, 1973).

Secondly, it is defined by

Webster as "kinship" and thirdly as a "state of
affairs existing between things having relations or
dealings, as in 'had a good relationship with his
family.'" This dissertation focuses on the use of the
word as applied to persons.
A "relation," here, is "the attitude or stance
which two or more persons or groups assume toward one
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another," or "the state of being mutually or
reciprocally interested (as in social or commercial
matters)" (Webster, 1973).

A personal relation occurs

when a person has an attitude, stance, or a state of
being interested in another person.

This attitude of

interest implies some form of communication involving
intellect and usually behavior.
Primacy of relationship.

This paper is not

speaking of the relationship between things, concepts,
or places but relationship between persons, external
and internal.

In speaking of relationship between

persons, it is not focusing on the proximity,
chronicity, or biologic interaction between persons,
though these do describe processes involved in
personal relationship.

Instead, this paper focuses on

the subjective experience, the existential quality of
personal relationship, not as a means to production of
something, but as an end in itself.
the production.

Relationship .ia

In this dissertation, use of the word

"relationship" denotes this specialized meaning unless
otherwise indicated.

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations
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Structure
The manner in which Fairbairn reoriented drive
theory can be traced relatively easily throughout his
papers.

The method of investigating that transition

here is to examine what Fairbairn had to say about
personality theory.

This will involve exposition with

the hope of tapping into the essential idea Fairbairn
pursued with vigor for so many years.

Aquinas'

thought will similarly be analyzed with regard to his
understanding of the theological discipline of
anthropology.

The following simple figure shows this

parallel relationship and structure of the paper.

Fi9ure 2.

Structure of the paper.

Fairbairn
Personality Theory

Aquinas
Anthropology

The plan of this paper is to delineate the nature
of the relationship between psychoanalytic objectrelations psychology and Western Orthodox Christian
theology.

Analysis of W. R. D. Fairbairn's writings
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will constitute the second chapter of the paper,
followed by an analysis of the relevant data from the
theology of Thomas Aquinas in the third chapter.

From

these analyses will emerge a common principle that
will act as a unifying theme for both domains.
is covered in the fourth chapter.

This
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CHAPTER 2

PRIMACY OF RELATIONSHIP FOR FAIRBAIRN

Introduction to Fairbairn

This chapter is in two parts.

The first part

introduces W. R. D. Fairbairn's work and the method he
employed in his psychoanalytic object-relations
theory.

The second part discusses his innovative

formulations on personality theory.

Three questions

of personality theory will serve as the major
divisions of the second part.
is a person put together?

What is a person?

How

Why is there a problem?

Work of Fairbairn
Literature Review
The following two categories will provide the
structure of the literature review.

The first is the

literature most basic and foundational, consisting of
Fairbairn's works.

In the second section, the first

applications of object-relations theory to theological
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studies, Christianity in particular, will be
investigated.

These have been included for their

contributions to the interdisciplinary dialogue
addressed in this dissertation.
Fairbairn's Works.

Sutherland's

(1989)

remarkable claim about Fairbairn bears repeating.
He was the first to propose in a systematic
manner the Copernican change of founding the
psychoanalytic theory of human personality on the
experiences within social relationships instead
of on the discharge of instinctual tensions
originating solely within the individual.

(p.

162)
Sutherland's (1989) book, Fairbairn's Journey into the
Interior, is an important biography which links

Fairbairn's life with his work.
Fairbairn's volume An Object-Relations Theory of
the Personality (1952a)

is foundational in the sense

that it traces his journey from acceptance of the
assumptions underlying Freud's drive theory to a
theory of object-relations based upon radically
different assumptions.

The volume contains the five

papers embodying the working out of his new point of
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view, in addition to three clinical papers and five
miscellaneous papers.
"Schizoid Factors in the Personality" (1940), the
first of the theoretical articles, describes
Fairbairn's decision to analyze a group of patients
not normally considered good candidates for
psychoanalysis.

Resident within these schizoid

clients, noted Fairbairn, is the basic psychic
condition shared by all persons, namely, the presence
of splits in the ego.
Evident in Fairbairn's structural description is
the influence of Melanie Klein, the main provider of
the tools Fairbairn would require to reorient Freud's
theory.

Also important in this article is the

attention Fairbairn called to the earliest dyadic
relationship.

From this relationship, he postulated,

could be traced the early phenomenon of ego splitting.
"A Revised Psychopathology of the Psychoses and
Psychoneuroses"

(1941) could as well have been titled,

"How the Splitting of the Ego Originated."
Fairbairn's growing discontent with Freudian precepts
is conspicuous here.

His headline, "The Inherent

Limitations of Libido Theory", is telling.
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Essentially, Fairbairn "recasted" orthodox libido
theory based upon what he considered the proper unit
of study.

It is "high time", he wrote, that classical

theory be transformed into "a theory of development
based essentially upon object-relationships"
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 31).
In the third of the theory articles,
Repression and Return of Bad Objects"

"The

(1943),

Fairbairn continued reworking the drive theory
assumptions he was finding untenable.

He critiques

orthodox theory in terms of twentieth-century physics,
proposing a theory of dynamic structure he finds more
synchronous with the science of his day.
The cogency of Fairbairn's theory comes into
clear view in this article in his description of
repetition compulsion.

While Freud had to go "Beyond

the Pleasure Principle" for his rationale, the
explanatory power of Fairbairn's theory is clearly
demonstrated.

In addition, Fairbairn begins to detail

his notion of the ego.
"Endopsychic Structure Considered in Terms of
Object-Relationships" (1944), the fourth article,
intends, as the title implies, to offer a replacement
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for Freud's tripartite structural theory.

The

lengthiest of Fairbairn's articles, it traces the
process and mechanics of ego splitting.

But while his

writing becomes increasingly technical and involved,
an ever-present aspect of his theory comes clear,
i.e., the personal nature of the early mother-infant
relationship.
He goes on to say that central to objectrelations theory is the person and his or her
relationships.

This is in contradistinction to

Freud's emphasis on the organism and its processes.
Fairbairn is attempting to account for psychological
conflict at the personal level.

Freud's explanations,

by virtue of their underlying assumptions, necessarily
took him outside the personal domain.
The fifth of Fairbairn's main papers, "ObjectRelationships and Dynamic Structure" (1946), continues
to develop lines of thought begun in earlier writings.
His main thesis is summarized by a female patient who
protested, "You're always talking about my wanting
this and that desire satisfied; but what I really want
is a father"

(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 137).

Other

contrasts between his theories and Freud's are
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enumerated, with Fairbairn's conveyance of due respect
for Freud in spite of their central points of
difference.

Fairbairn here declares that "Freud's

whole system of thought was concerned with objectrelationships~

(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 149).

Fairbairn

believed the difference between Freud and himself was
in how each accounted for object-relationships.
Object-relations applied to theology.

Harry

Guntrip, a protegee of Fairbairn, is especially
qualified to discuss the relationship between
Fairbairn's theory of object-relations and religious
issues.

Trained in religion and philosophy (like

Fairbairn), clergyman Guntrip became enamored with
Fairbairn's theory, and saw in it the needed
corrective to drive theory.
Though his representation of Fairbairn's theory
has been criticized by some, Guntrip has done a
service not only by calling attention to the
significance of Fairbairn's work, but by seizing upon
the reason it is significant.

In his Personality

Structure and Human Interaction: The Developing
Synthesis of Psychodynamic Theory (1977), the stated
theme is to trace the way in which psychoanalysis has
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"outgrown its origins in a neuropsychological and
psychobiological philosophy of man, using the instinct
concept as the basis of theory, into a truly
psychodynamic theory of the personality implying a
philosophy of man that takes account of his reality as
an individual person" (p. 17).

Guntrip believed

Fairbairn's object-relations theory represented that
truly psychodynamic theory into which psychoanalysis
was growing.

Guntrip (1977), commented on Fairbairn's

integration of religion and psychology:
For Fairbairn religion is an impressive activity
and experience of human beings .
approached . .

. . and is to be

. with sympathetic insight in

order to understand what human beings have
actually been seeking and doing in their
religious life,

.

.

. religion provides a more

illuminating analogy to the aims and processes of
psychotherapy than either science or education
do.

He [Fairbairn] even recognizes no

inconsiderable part of psycho-dynamic theory
implicit, if not yet scientifically formulated,
in religious concepts.

.

.

Fairbairn's

interest in the psychology of religion is one
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expression of his fundamental concern with
'object-relationships' as the substance of human
living.

(pp. 252, 253)

Another clinician influenced by Fairbairn's works
is Ana-Maria Rizzuto.

Her book, The Birth of the

Living God (1979), attempts to trace "the genesis of a
person's representation of God" in the course of
development and how the person uses that
representation during the life cycle (p. viii).

Her

review of the psychoanalytic literature includes both
Klein and Fairbairn, whose theoretical constructs
provide a useful way of viewing an important aspect of
religious behavior.

W. W. Meissner, an endorser of

Rizzuto's book, has contributed in this same arena.

Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience (1984) marks
his effort to bring about a rapprochement between
these two domains.

Meissner mainly calls upon the

contributions of Winnicott (1971), a contemporary of
Fairbairn's.
John McDargh (1983) has provided a comprehensive
example of object-relations perspectives informing
religious thought, with Psychoanalytic Object-

relations Theory and the Study of Religion:

On Faith
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and the Imaging of God.

He regards the contributions

of Fairbairn as foundational for any study concerned
with these two disciplines.

His colleague, Jones

(1991), a clinical psychologist and professor of
religion, wrote Contemporary Psychoanalysis and
Religion, drawing from more recent object-relations
theorists in addition to Fairbairn.
His Thought
Fairbairn himself summed up his theory in his
1958 article, "On the Nature and Aims of PsychoAnalytical Treatment" (p. 374).
In brief, my theoretical position may be said to
be characterized by four main conceptual
formulations:--viz.
psychical structure,

(a) a theory of dynamic
(b) a theory to the effect

that libidinal activity is inherently and
primarily object-seeking,

(c) a resulting theory

of libidinal development couched, not in terms of
presumptive zonal dominance, but in terms of the
quality of dependence, and (d) a theory of the
personality couched exclusively in terms of
internal object-relationships.
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Fairbairn goes on to say that he sees the first
two of these to be a substitute for Freud's classic
libido theory and final theory of instincts.

The

third he views as a revision of Abraham's version of
Freud's theory of libidinal development.

Fairbairn

means for the fourth to replace Freud's description of
the mental structure of id, ego, and superego.
This last [fourth] has assumed the form of a
description in terms of a libidinal ego, a
central ego and an antilibidinal ego, together
with their respective internal objects; and the
basic endopsychic situation so constituted is
conceived as resulting from the splitting of an
original, inherent, unitary ego and of the object
originally introjected by it.

(Fairbairn, 1958,

p. 374)

This brief overview precedes the more detailed
account of Fairbairn's work in the following sections.
The next section is meant to provide the reader with
an introduction to the scientific method Fairbairn
employed in his clinical and theoretical work.
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Method of Fairbairn
Writing Style
Several challenges and privileges meet the
Fairbairn researcher.

One, is that he himself said of

his major work that he is offering "not the systematic
elaboration of an already established point of view,
but the progressive development of a line of thought"
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 133).

His work is a collection

of papers and so, as with Freud, one is enabled to relive the unfolding of the issues with which he
grappled.
Fairbairn wrote in an analytical and systematized
manner, compressing many concepts into few words.

In

poetry, the qualities of brevity, aesthetics, and
logical permutations and combinations are integral to
the powerful creative force of the work.

Perhaps

Fairbairn's background in philosophy and theology,
like that of the poet T. S. Eliot, helps give his
writing its depth.

Something of the dynamic of

Fairbairn's work is in his style.

It is his very

preciseness and incisiveness on major issues in
personality theory which has made history.
done so with great clarity and impact.

He has
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Psycho-analytic Science
Fairbairn deals with the methodology of
psychoanalysis in his 1952, 1955, and 1958 articles.
In his 1958 paper, he begins by quoting his 1955
article's view of science in general.

He says that

science is
'essentially an intellectual tool and nothing
more.'

From this point of view, scientific

truth, so far from providing an (even
approximately) accurate picture of reality as it
exists, is 'simply explanatory truth;' and the
'picture of reality provided by science is an
intellectual construct representing the fruits of
an attempt to describe the various phenomena of
the universe, in as coherent and systematic a
manner as the limitations of human intelligence
permit, by means of the formulation of general
laws established by inductive inference under
conditions of maximum emotional detachment and
objectivity on the part of the scientific
observer [italics original].'

(p. 376)
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Farther along in this article he gives his view
of the particular science in which he admits

operating--psychological science.
'Where psychological science is concerned, a
certain difficulty arises owing to the fact that
the subjective aspects of the phenomena studied
are as much part of the phenomena as the
objective aspects, and are actually more
important; and the subjective aspects can only be
understood in terms of the subjective experience
of the psychologist himself.'

(Fairbairn, 1958,

pp . 3 7 6' 3 7 7 )
He then says that the psychologist must adopt as
detached and objective a stance as possible, with
respect to his own experience and the experience of
those he observes.

He posits that this has particular

application to those involved in "psycho-analytical

science."

He notes that the psycho-analyst (his

spelling) is not primarily a scientist but a
psychotherapist and as such is involved a departure
from the scientific method.

Being a psychotherapist

implies that the value of being free of symptoms is
better than being dominated by them, whereas being a
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scientist does not.

Taking on the therapeutic role

necessarily involves "'the acceptance of human values
other than the explanatory value which is the sole
value accepted by science'" (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 377).
Even still, Fairbairn claims that objectrelations (his spelling) theory, with its emphasis on
the real relationship between the therapist and
patient, provides a psychology which "not only
promotes therapeutic aims more effectively than the
predominantly 'impulse-psychology' formulated by
Freud, but actually corresponds more closely to the
psychological facts and possesses a greater
explanatory value from a purely scientific standpoint"
(Fairbairn, 1958, p. 377).
How is psycho-analysis science?

Fairbairn says

the technique itself constitutes a valid experimental
method.

The limitations imposed are not those

inherent in the method but from the commitment to the
humanitarian values of being therapeutic.

Based on

the technique of free association, the phenomenon of
transference, and the inference of a present inner
reality, Fairbairn says
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the analytical session may now be seen to satisfy
the experimental requirement of providing an
opportunity for (to quote Ezriel)

'the

observation of here and now [italics original]
phenomena in situations which allow us to test
whether a number of defined conditions will
produce a certain predicted
event'
lf/:
p. 30).

(Ezriel, 1951,

(Fairbairn, 1952, p. 127)

The preceding introduction to Fairbairn's method
is meant to serve as a guide to assessing and
appreciating the content, reliability, and validity of
his work.

The following section, the second part of

this chapter, deals with Fairbairn's concept of the
person, his theory of personality.

Personality Theory

This section presents Fairbairn's view of what a
person is (nature), how a person is put together
(manner), and why there is a problem for the person
(reason).

Webster's first definition of "nature" is

"the inherent character or basic constitution of a
person or thing: essence"

(1973, p. 766).

By "manner"
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is meant the way or method, according to Webster, in
which a person is structured (Webster, 1973, p. 700).
"Reason" is defined by Webster as "a statement offered
in explanation or justification" (1973, p. 962).

The

first part, then, discusses the person' nature as
object seeking, the second speaks of the manner in
which a person is structured as a pristine mind/body
unity, and the third shows the reason there is a
problem, namely, that of splits in the ego.

Wbat is a Person--Nature?
Introduction
To understand Fairbairn, one must start with
Freud.

The following is Guntrip's (1973) rendering of

an aspect of connection between the two.
Freud's ideas fall into two main groups,

(1) the

id-plus-ego-control apparatus, and (2) the
Oedipus complex of family object-relationship
situations with their reappearance in treatment
as transference and resistance.

The first group

of ideas tends to picture the psyche as a
mechanism, an impersonal arrangement for securing
detensioning, a homeostatic organization.

The
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second group tends toward a personal psychology
of the influence people have on each other's
lives, particularly parents on children.

(p. 28)

In the 1940s and early 1950s Fairbairn did
call his work object-relationships theory,
implying not a new theory, but a deliberate
emphasis on the personal side of Freud's theory
of parent-child (Oedipal) relations . . . .
Object-relations is not a school of thought but a
broad stream of thought, a steadily developing
concentration on "the personal ego in objectrelat ions.

(p. 24)

Relationship Seeking
Briefly stated, Fairbairn believed that life
begins with the need for relationship, that a child's
need for an object in the beginning is the motivation
for development.

It is the internalization of

experience with the primary caregiver (object) that
constitutes the vicissitudes of life.
Fairbairn (1952a), in his 1940 paper on schizoid
factors, describes the first outworking of this drive
for relationship in the infant.
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The child's oral relationship with his mother in
the situation of suckling represents his first
experience of a love relationship, and is,
therefore, the foundation upon which all his
future relationships with love objects are based.
It also represents his first experience of a
social relationship; and it therefore forms the
basis of his subsequent attitude to society.
6Q f

(pp.

61)

Guntrip (1989) speaks of the shift in
psychoanalytic thinking that this represented in terms
of libido.
Fairbairn's object-relations theory arose out of
his study of schizoid problems, and throws much
light on the schizoid's 'life inside himself.' He
laid it down that the goal of the individual's
libido is not pleasure, or merely subjective
gratification, but the object itself.

He says:

'Pleasure is the sign-post to the object'
p. 33).

(1952a,

The fundamental fact about human nature

is our libidinal drive towards good objectrelationships.

The key biological formula is the

adaptation of the organism to the environment.
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The key psychological formula is the relationship
of the person to the human environment.

The

significance of human living lies in objectrelationships, and only in such terms can our
life be said to have meaning,

for without object-

relations the ego itself cannot develop [italics
original].

(pp. 19, 20)

Fairbairn says that this theory of objectrelationships is not such a revolutionary step in
psychoanalytic theory because many of the writings of
Freud himself take for granted that libido is
specifically object-seeking.

Fairbairn quotes from

page 95 of Freud's 1930 work, Civilization and its
Discontents, which refers to Freud's original theory
of instincts, though the distinction here made by
Freud was later abandoned by him with his concept of
narcissism.
Thus first arose the contrast between ego
instincts and object instincts.

For the energy

of the latter instincts and exclusively for them
I introduced the term libido; an antithesis was
then formed between the ego instincts and the
libidinal instincts directed towards them.
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Love seeks for objects.

(Freud quoted in

Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 83)
Fairbairn (1952a) plots his course toward a
theory emphasizing the personal, relational side to
psychoanalysis in his 1941 paper, "A Revised
Psychopathology of the Psychoses and Neuroses."
There, his first statement to this end starts by
paying homage to Freud's libido theory yet moves on to
propose a different one.
The historical importance of the libido theory
and the extent to which it has contributed to the
advance of psychoanalytical knowledge requires no
elaboration; and the merit of the theory has been
proved by its heuristic value alone.
Nevertheless, it would appear as if the point had
now been reached at which, in the interests of
progress, the classic libido theory would have to
be transformed into a theory of development based
essentially upon object-relationships [italics
original].

The great limitation of the present

libido theory as an explanatory system resides in
the fact that it confers the status of libidinal
attitudes upon various manifestations which turn
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out to be merely techniques for regulating the
object-relationships of the ego [italics
original].

The libido theory is based, of

course, upon the conception of erotogenic zones.
It must be recognized, however, that in the first
instance erotogenic zones are simply channels
through which libido flows, and that a zone only
becomes erotogenic when libido flows through it.
The ultimate goal of libido is the object
[italics original] : .

(p. 31)

He goes on to explain that, in its search for the
object, libido, operating like the laws which
determine the flow of electricity, takes the path of
least resistance, the erotogenic zone being considered
the path of least resistance.

In infancy, this path

is the mouth, whereas in maturity, it is the genitals.
"The real point about the mature individual is not
that the libidinal attitude is essentially genital,
but that the genital attitude is essentially
libidinal" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 32).
At the same time, it must be stressed that it is
not in virtue of the fact that the genital level
has been reached that object-relationships are
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satisfactory.

On the contrary, it is in virtue

of the fact that satisfactory objectrelationships have been established that true
genital sexuality is attained.

(Fairbairn, 1952a,

p. 32)
Two years after the 1941 paper on revised
psychopathology, Fairbairn wrote "The Repression and
the Return of the Bad Objects (with special reference
to the 'War Neuroses')."

In it, he declares that,

"the time is now ripe for a psychology of objectrelationships"

(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60).

He goes on

to say that
psychology may be said to resolve itself into a
study of the relationships of the individual to
his objects, whilst, in similar terms,
psychopathology may be said to resolve itself
more specifically into a study of the
relationships of the ego to its internalized
objects.

(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60)2

2More will be said about internalized objects in
the succeeding sections of this paper.
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Thus Fairbairn affirmed a different thrust to
psychoanalytic theory, the primacy of relationship as
the substance of human living.

The next section here

looks more closely at how a person is structured,
psyche and soma, mind and body, in order to seek
relationship.

How is a Person put together for Relationship--the
Manner?
Introduction
The previous section on the nature of the person
alluded several times to a person's erotogenic,
biological functions

(soma, body) as well as to the

object seeking, psychological workings (psyche, mind) .
How does Fairbairn see these interrelating?

And is

there essential unity in the self from birth,
especially in the psyche?

This is the subject

broached in what follows here.
Mind-Body Unity
As regards the question of whether there is unity
in the psyche of a new born, Fairbairn would answer
yes, listing as his first theoretical assumption
concerning the self, that the pristine personality of
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the child consists of a unitary dynamic ego.3

This is

in contradistinction to Freud who conceived of the ego
as a structure which is essentially acquired (and not
pristine), constituting, in essence, a modification.
Freud said the ego originated as a structure which
develops in the psyche to regulate id impulses in
relation to the reality of the outside world.
Thus it is an integral feature of Freud's
description of 'the ego' that this structure is
essentially a defensive (and not, like my
'original ego', an inherent) structure; and it
would appear to follow that Freud's 'ego' is
founded upon a basis which is essentially
psychopathological.

(Fairbairn, 1958, p. 375)

Fairbairn (1954) explains his method of
describing the endopsychic situation in contrast to
Freud's with a comparison to methods in physics.
The conception of this basic endopsychic
situation provides an alternative, couched in

3Fairbairn later agreed with Guntrip that 'self'
was a better term than 'ego' and so the two are used
interchangeably in this paper (Scharff, 1990).
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terms of personal relationships and dynamic egostructure, to Freud's description of the psyche
in terms of id, ego and super-ego, based as this
is upon a Helmholtzian divorce of energy from
structure no longer accepted in physics, and
combined as it is, albeit at the expense of no
little inconsistency, with a non-personal
psychology conceived in terms of biological
instincts and erotogenic zones.

(p. 109)

Fairbairn believes that what classical Freudian
metapsychology does is to take the human person
who is [italics original] energy operating in
directional ways (toward objects) and to
superimpose upon that human process an artificial
distinction between the activities and the energy
presumed to be fueling them.

.

one is left

with a set of energyless structures (the ego) and
a pool of structureless energy (the id) .
For Fairbairn,

. .

. Ego structures have energy--

are [italics original] energy--and that energy is
structured and directed toward objects from the
start.

(Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 155)
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Thus, it is argued by Fairbairn that the ego is an
integrated structure from the outset.

He says that

this conception is in conformity with the trend of
biological science which says that the organism is
conceived as a "patterned structure which functions as
a whole in the absence of disintegrating influences"
(Fairbairn, 1955, p. 149).
A year subsequent to the 1943 paper on the return
of the bad objects, Fairbairn wrote, "Endopsychic
Structure Considered in Terms of ObjectRelationships."

Herein he articulates some of the

intricacies of the relationship between the psychical
phenomenon of object-relationships and the somatic
realities of instincts and impulses.
The limitations of impulse psychology make
themselves felt in a very practical sense within
the therapeutic field; for, whilst to reveal the
nature of his 'impulses' to a patient by
painstaking analysis is one proposition, to
enable him to know what to do with these
'impulses' is quite another.

What an individual

shall do with his 'impulses' is clearly a problem
of object-relationships.

. . .

In a word
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'impulses' cannot be considered apart from the
endopsychic structures which they energize and
the object-relationships which they enable these
structures to establish; and, equally,
'instincts' cannot profitably be considered as
anything more than forms of energy which
constitute the dynamic of such endopsychic
structures.

(Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 84, 85)

This formulation would suggest that the
biological is substantially in the service of the
psyche, to promote its ends of object seeking.

But it

is not a slave relationship, as if one ruled the
other, but a cooperation, a unity of mind and body
relating.

Fairbairn says it is not, as Freud

believed, that the ego regulates id impulses in
relation to the reality of the outside world but that
the ego is the source of impulse-tension from the
beginning.

"No 'impulses' can be regarded as existing

in the absence of an ego structure, it will no longer
be possible to preserve any psychological distinction
between the id and the ego" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 88).
In other words, the person starts out with a pristine,
unitary structure, with its own dynamic impulses
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originating from within the ego itself, not with
impulses acting on it from another structure (id) .
This inclusion of the id in the ego will, of
course, leave essentially unaffected Freud's
conception of the function [italics original]
served by the 'ego' in regulating the discharge
of impulse-tension in deference to the conditions
of outer reality.

It will, however, involve the

view that 'impulses' are oriented towards
reality, and thus to some extent determined by
the 'reality principle', from the very beginning.
(Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 88, 89)
Cooperative Unity of Mind/Body Seen in Development
Development of pysche and soma is coordinated and
parallel, according to Fairbairn.

He sees the

physical, erotogenic zones as providing pathways for
meeting the psychical, object-seeking needs.
Naturally, these zones develop in maturity on a
biological timetable.

That they are employed in a

psychologically mature way is not a psychical given.
For example, Fairbairn would say that true genital
sexuality is not attained just by reaching the
biological stage of genital development but when
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satisfactory object-relationships have been
established.

It is the coordination of the technique

(erotogenic zone) with the goal of object seeking
(psychological reality) which constitutes healthj•
development.

The libidinal technique does not

determine the object-relationship.

It is the object-

relationship which determines the libidinal technique.
The function of libidinal pleasure is essentially
to provide a sign-post to the object.

To say the

opposite, that the object is a sign-post to libidinal
pleasure, is to put the cart before the horse and
mistake technique for a primary libidinal
manifestation.

Fairbairn (1952a, pp. 33, 34) shows

the difference in these two ways of thinking in
answering the question,
thumb?'

'Why does a baby suck his/her

He says that if one answers that the baby's

mouth is an erotogenic zone and sucking provides
him/her with erotic pleasure, one is missing the
point.
A further question need be asked,
thumb?'

Fairbairn would answer,

breast to suck.'

'Why the

'Because there is no

"Even the baby must have a libidinal

object; and, if he is deprived of his natural object
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{the breast), he is driven to provide an object for
himself" {1952a, pp. 33, 34).

Fairbairn goes on to

comment on autoerotism, that it is fundamentally a
"technique whereby the individual seeks not only to
provide for himself what he cannot obtain from the
object, but to provide for himself an object which he
cannot obtain" {1952a, pp. 33, 34).
Of development, then, Fairbairn says, "the whole
course of libidinal development depends upon the
extent to which objects are incorporated and the
nature of the techniques which are employed to deal
with incorporated objects [italics original]"
{Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 34).
The development of object-relationships is
essentially a process whereby infantile
dependence upon the object gradually gives place
to mature dependence upon the object.

This

process is characterized (a) by the gradual
abandonment of an original object-relationship
based upon primary identification, and {b) by the
gradual adoption of an object-relationship based
upon differentiation of the object.

The gradual

change which occurs in the nature of the object-
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relationship is accompanied by a gradual change
in libidinal aim, whereby an original oral,
sucking, incorporating and predominantly 'taking'
aim comes to be replaced by a mature, nonincorporating and predominantly 'giving' aim
compatible with developed genital sexuality.
(Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 34, 35)
Fairbairn charted the development of objectrelationships, their accompanying erotogenic zones,
and their natural objects (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 3841) .

This scheme is represented in the following

figure.
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Figure 3.

Development of object relationships.

Developmental Stage

Characterized

Object

by
1. Infantile Dependence •attitude of
taking
•incorporating
a. Early Oral

•suck or reject

•breast of

(pre-ambivalent)

mother
(part object)

b. Late Oral

•sucking or

•mother

biting

w/ breast

(ambivalent)

(whole obj
treated as
part obj)

2. Transition between

•dichotomy and

Infantile Dependence exteriorization

•person
(whole obj

and

of

treated as

Mature Dependence,

incorporated obj

contents)

or Stage of QuasiIndependence
(figure continues)
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Figure 3--Continued

3. Mature Dependence

•attitude of

•person

giving

(whole obj

•accepted and

with genital

rejected objects organs)
exteriorized
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Maturity, that is, mature dependence, is not seen
as the state of not needing others.

In his 1941

article, Fairbairn (1952a) contrasts this stage with
infantile dependence.
It is true, of course, that mature individuals
are likewise dependent upon one another for the
satisfaction of their psychological, no less than
their physical, needs.

Nevertheless, on the

psychological side, the dependence of mature
individuals is not unconditional.

By contrast,

the very helplessness of the child is sufficient
to render him dependent in an unconditional
sense. .

. .

His psychological dependence is

further accentuated by the very nature of his
object-relationships; for, as we have seen, this
is based essentially upon identification.
Identification may thus be regarded as
representing the persistence into extra-uterine
life of a relationship that existed before birth.
In so far as identification persists after birth,
the individual's object constitutes not only his
world, but also himself; and it is to this fact,
as has already been pointed out, that we must
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attribute the compulsive attitude of many
schizoid and depressive individuals towards their
objects.

Normal development is

characterized by a process whereby progressive
differentiation of the object is accompanied by a
progressive decrease in identification.

(p. 47)

In infantile dependence, the conflict of the
early stage is 'to suck or not to suck,' that is,
love or not to love.'
state.

'to

This underlies the schizoid

The conflict of the late oral stage is 'to

suck or bite,' that is,

'to love or to hate.'

underlies the depressive state.

This

"The great problem of

the schizoid individual is how to love without
destroying by love, whereas the great problem of the
depressive individual is how to love without
destroying by hate" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 49).
In order to defend against the schizoid or
depressive position, several techniques are used in
the transitional stage.

Each technique is a specific

method for dealing with the conflict of the
transitional stage, a conflict between the
developmental urge to advance to an attitude of mature
dependence on the object and a regressive reluctance
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to abandon the attitude of infantile dependence on the
object (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 38).

They are not

utilized in any order and may operate in combination.
These techniques are put in chart form by
Fairbairn and are presented below (Fairbairn, 1952a,
pp. 43-46).

It should also be noted that each object,

the accepted and rejected object, is an internal
object.

"Internalized" means the person sees the

object as in himself/herself.

"Externalized" means

the person sees the object as outside himself/herself.
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Figure 4.

Transitional stage techniques.

Technique

Accepted

Obsessional

Internalized

Internalized

Paranoid

Internalized

Externalized

Hysterical

Externalized

Internalized

Phobic

Externalized

Externalized

Obj

Rejected

Obj

As can be seen, this account of the unitary ego,
the interplay between psyche and soma, and the course
of development is not the whole story in the life of
an individual.

Introduced above is the idea of

externalizing and internalizing internal objects in
the transitional stage and identifying in the oral
stages, the object even being perceived as the infant
himself/herself.

Although Fairbairn states that the

newborn has a pristine, unitary, and inherently
object-seeking ego, with the psyche and soma operating
together through developmental stages and their
appropriate erotogenic connections, he also observes a
problem occurring which disturbs this course.

The
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reason why there is a problem is the subject of the
next section.

Wby is there a Problem in Relationship--the Reason?
Introduction
According to Fairbairn, life begins with the need
for a relationship.

The child's need for an object in

the beginning is the motivation for development.

The

internalization of experience with the mother, the
primary object, is that which constitutes the
vicissitudes of life.

It is the struggle to take in

that experience and also to be one's own self, that
is, to keep out aspects of the experience, to be
autonomous, that determines development.
In the beginning, the child takes in the preambivalent object.

The only option is to take in or

leave out, accept or reject.

Then the child splits

out what is too painful to be borne in consciousness.
So splitting is the first organizing phenomenon, and
it happens as a defense against painful experience,
the mother who is not there when the infant needs her.
This is the reason why there is a problem in
development--splitting of the ego (Scharff, 1990).

An
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explanation of this phenomenon follows under the next
sub-heading.
The following figure on Fairbairn's ego structure
is provided as a guide to the subsequent material.

It

is a rendering of Fairbairn's ego structure with the
direction of repression indicated by arrows (Scharff &
Scharff, 1991, March) .
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Figure 5.

Structure of the ego.

Ubidlnai
ego

CENTRAL

EGO

Antlllbldlnat
ego
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Split in Integrity of Relating
Fairbairn (1952a) explains his theory of
splitting in his 1954 article.

The pristine

personality of the child consists of a unitary and
dynamic ego.

The first defense employed by the

original ego to deal with unsatisfying personal
relationship is mental internalization, introjection,
of the unsatisfying object.

Jill Savage Scharff says

that introjection
is a way of dealing with an object that feels
bad, by taking it inside and controlling it there
by pushing it out of consciousness.

This

mechanism leaves good aspects of the object
uncontaminated by the more troublesome exciting
and rejecting aspects.

(1992, p. 57)

The unsatisfying object has two disturbing
aspects, an exciting aspect and a rejecting aspect.
The second defense used by the ego is to reject and
split-off from the internalized object two elements-one representing its exciting aspect and one
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representing its rejecting aspect.4

David Scharff

(1990) gives as an example of the exciting object, or
the object excessively excitative of need, the mother
who offered ice cream when milk would have done
better, the mother who hovers too close because she is
afraid of separation from the infant.

She is always

inducing the feeling that she must be needed, or why
would she hover so closely?
The internalized object is therefore split into
three objects:

exciting object, rejecting object, and

the nucleus which remains after these elements have
been split-off.

This residual nucleus represents the

relatively satisfying, tolerable, aspect of the
internalized object.

It is therefore not rejected by

the ego but remains actively cathected.
the ideal object.
enough object."

It is called

Scharff (1990) calls this the "good
The rejection and splitting-off of

the exciting and rejecting objects constitute an act
of "direct and primary repression" on the part of the

4"Repression and splitting of the ego represent
simply two aspects of the same fundamental process"
(Fairbairn, 1954, p. 106).
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ego.

Since the exciting and rejecting objects remain

cathected while in the process of being repressed,
their repression involves a splitting-off from the
substance of the ego of two portions of the ego.
These portions represent the respective cathexes of
the two repressed objects.
The splitting-off of these two portions of the
ego from its remaining central portion represents an
act of "direct and secondary repression" on the part
of the central portion.

The resulting endopsychic

situation is one in which there is a central ego
cathecting the ideal object as an acceptable internal
object and two split-off and repressed ego-structures,
each cathecting a repressed internal object.
Fairbairn called the repressed ego-structure
cathecting the exciting object, the libidinal ego, and
the repressed ego-structure cathecting the rejecting
object, the antilibidinal ego.5

SThe name Fairbairn first used for the repressed
ego-structure cathecting the rejecting object was the
"internal saboteur" instead of the "antilibidinal
ego."

Scharff (1990) says that this was his more
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The name, "antilibidinal ego," is used on the
grounds that the repressed ego-structure so
designated, being in alliance with the rejecting
object, has aims inherently hostile to those of the
libidinal ego in its alliance with the exciting
object.

Being a dynamic structure, the antilibidinal

ego implements its hostility to the aims of the
libidinal ego by subjecting the libidinal ego to a
sustained aggressive and persecutory attack which
supports the repression already exercised against it
by the central ego, and which it thus seems
appropriate to describe as a process of "indirect
repression."
This indirect repression, where the
antilibidinal, rejecting complex attacks the
libidinal, need exciting complex, is seen in clinical
settings.

Scharff (1990) notes that couples act this

out, coming in fighting like cats and dogs, yet not
wanting a divorce.

The anger is magnified to cover up

clinical description while "antilibidinal ego" was the
term he devised later when trying to smooth out his
theoretical formulation with a clean symmetry.
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this very painful longing.

In this sense there is

nothing as painful as unrequited longing for each
other.

These are people who have not been able to

feel that their longing will be able to get a loving
satisfaction from each other and they fight in order
to subdue it, to keep down this unrequited longing.
Although direct and indirect repression of the
libidinal ego are two processes of a quite different
nature, they are both included under the single term
"repression" as understood by Freud.

It should be

noted that Freud took little account of direct
repression of the antilibidinal ego by the central
ego.

The only references are in
The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1927, pp. 52, 53, 74,
75) in which he raised the questions why the
super-ego is unconscious, and whether, in the
case of the hysterical personality at any rate,
this instigator of repression is not itself
subject to repression--questions to which the
exigencies of his own theory did not permit of a
satisfactory answer.

(Fairbairn, 1954, p. 108)

Although the antilibidinal ego, the rejecting
object and the ideal object are all independent
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structures playing different roles in the economy of
the psyche, they are all included by Freud in the
comprehensive concept of the "the super-ego;" and this
source of confusion may be obviated by recognition of
their independent character.

The endopsychic

situation resulting from the twin processes of
repression and splitting, which have just been
described, is one which, in its general outlines,
inevitably becomes established in the child at an
early age, and in this sense may be regarded as
"normal;" but, especially in its dynamic aspect, it
contains within it the potentialities of all
psychopathological developments in later life.
By way of example, Fairbairn applies the
foregoing explanation of splitting to the hysteric
(Fairbairn, 1954, p. 109).

For the hysteric, the

exciting object is excessively exciting and the
rejecting object is excessively rejecting.

As such,

the libidinal ego is excessively libidinal and the
antilibidinal ego is excessively persecutory.
helps explain the intensity of the hysteric's
repressed sexuality and the extent of her/his
compulsive sacrifice of sexuality.

This
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It might be helpful to refer to the Figure 4 in
this chapter, the chart on four techniques used for
dealing with the conflict of the transitional stage.
In this figure, the hysteric technique is said to
externalize the accepted object and internalize the
rejected object.

It must be remembered that each

object, the accepted object and rejected object, are
internal objects.

The hysteric's externalized

accepted object is seen in their intense love
relationships.

The internalized rejected object is

seen in his/her dissociation, rejecting his/her own
genitals which are identified "with the breast as the
original libidinal object during the period of
infantile dependence" (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 44, 45).
In contrast with the hysteric technique of
overvaluing objects in the outer world, the paranoid
technique is to regard objects in the outer world as
persecutors.

The hysteric dissociates as a form of

self-depreciation while the paranoid attitude is
extravagantly grandiose.

The paranoid state involves

the externalization of the rejected object and
internalization of the accepted object (Fairbairn,
1952a, pp. 45, 46).
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In his 1943 article, "The Repression and the
Return of Bad Objects," Fairbairn speaks to the
futility of repression as a means of coping.

This is

seen in the mechanism persons routinely use which he
calls "the moral defense," or "the defence of the
super-ego," or "the defence of guilt," against the bad
object (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 65-67).

The child would

rather be bad himself /herself than to have bad
objects.

She/he takes into herself/himself,

internalizes, the badness, the bad object in order to
feel the sense of security which an environment of
good objects can bring.
The sense of outer security resulting from this
process of internalization is, however, liable to
be seriously compromised by the resulting
presence within him of internalized bad objects.
Outer security is thus purchased at the price of
inner insecurity; and his ego is henceforth left
at the mercy of a band of internal fifth
columnists or persecutors, against which defences
have to be, first hastily erected, and later
laboriously consolidated.
66)

(Fairbairn, 1952a, pp.
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The dilemma is placed in religious terms when he
says that the person prefers conditional badness over
unconditional badness.

It is much better to be a bad

person living in a world ruled by God than it is to be
a good person in a world ruled by the devil.

If you

live in hell, there is no hope, it is unconditional,
and being a good person doesn't help.

But if you live

in a world in which you are a sinner but salvation is
eminent, there is always hope (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp.
65-67) .

Why does the child internalize bad objects?
She/he is compelled to internalize them in order to
control them.

Yet, in attempting to control them in

this way, the child is internalizing objects which
have wielded power over her/him in the external world
and which then retain their power over her/him in the
inner world.
In a word, he is 'possessed' by them, as if by
evil spirits.

This is not all, however.

The

child not only internalizes his bad objects
because they force themselves upon him and he
seeks to control them, but also, and above all,
because he needs [italics original] them.

If a
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child's parents are bad objects, he cannot reject
them, even if they do not force themselves upon
him; for he cannot do without them.

Even if they

neglect him, he cannot reject them; for,

if they

neglect him, his need for them is increased.
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 67)
Freud's paper on a artist, Christoph Haitzmann,
who made a pact with the Devil, conceptualizes the
situation in classic "libido is primarily pleasureseeking" framework.

Fairbairn disagrees when he

comments on Freud's paper that
the whole point of a pact with the Devil lies in
the fact that it involves a relationship with a
bad object.

Indeed, this is made perfectly plain

in the terms of Christoph's bond; for,
pathetically enough, what he sought from Satan in
the depths of his depression was not the capacity
to enjoy wine, women, and song, but permission,
to quote the terms of the pact itself,
leibeigner Sohn zu sein'

'sein

('for to be unto him

euen [sic] as a sonne of his bodie').

What he

sold his eternal soul to obtain, accordingly, was
not gratification, but a father, albeit one who

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations
67

had been a bad object to him in his childhood.
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 71)
Fairbairn says that "libidinal 'badness' should
be related to the cathexis of bad objects ('sin'
always being regarded, according to the Hebraic
conception, as seeking after strange gods, and
according to the Christian conception, as yielding to
the Devil) . . . " (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 74).

This

again emphasizes his idea of selling one's
relationships in the external world in exchange for
relationships with the gods, or Devil, of the internal
world.
This section has spoken of Fairbairn's views on
splitting and its effects on the persons functioning
as she/he defends against the effects of such
splitting.

It has to do with exchanging the truth of

the external world for the lie of the internal world,
the pain of real relationships for the hope of more
controlled, tolerable relationships, indeed, selling
one's relationship with the outside world for one with
devils.

Regarding all psychopathology, Fairbairn says

the following.
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It is to the realm of these bad objects, I feel
convinced, rather than to the realm of the superego that the ultimate origin of all
psychopathological developments is to be traced;
for it may be said of all psychoneurotic and
psychotic patients that, if a True Mass is being
celebrated in the chancel, a Black Mass is being
celebrated in the crypt.

It becomes evident,

accordingly, that the psychotherapist is the true
successor to the exorcist, and that he is
concerned, not only with 'the forgiveness of
sins,' but also with 'the casting out of devils.'
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70)

Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced

w.

R. D. Fairbairn's

work, his method, and his groundbreaking formulations
on personality theory.

Three aspects of personality

theory were discussed:

that persons are object-

relationship seeking, that the ego is pristine and
unitary at birth and develops as a psyche and body,
and the problem of ego splitting.
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The next chapter asks the same questions of St.
Thomas Aquinas as were asked of Fairbairn concerning
the person, only Aquinas' lens is that of the
theological discipline of anthropology instead of the
psychological one of personality theory.

The

questions asked concern introductory matters around
Aquinas' work, his method, and his history making
thinking on anthropology.
person put together?

What is a person?

Why is there a problem?

How is a
These

are the questions which will be explored as the next
chapter unfolds.
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CHAPTER 3

PRIMACY OF RELATIONSHIP FOR AQUINAS

Introduction to Aquinas

Like the previous chapter, this chapter is in two
parts.

The first part introduces Thomas Aquinas' work

and the method he employed in his philosophy and
theology.

The second part discusses his innovative

formulations on anthropology.

Three questions of

anthropology will serve as the major divisions for the
second part.
together?

What is a person?

How is a person put

Why is there a problem?

Work of Aquinas
Literature Reyiew
This section divides Aquinas' works into two
categories, translations of his actual works and
commentaries on his life and work.

Of his works, the

major ones consulted here are the Summa Contra
Gentiles (written 1258-1263), Summa Theologica
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(written 1272-1273), Questions on the Soul (written
1268-1270), and selected theological texts (Gilby,
1955; Glenn, 1978; Pegis, 1948) .

Of commentaries on

his life and work, five are especially important for
this paper.

They are written by G. K. Chesterton

(1956), H. D. Gardeil (1959), F. C. Copelston (1970),
and E. Gilson (1963).
Each of Aquinas' works below can be seen as a
mixture of philosophy and Christian theology, each
informing the other.

The best know works of Aquinas

are his two systematic ones, Summa Contra Gentiles (A
Summary against the Gentiles) and Summa Theologica
Summary of Theology) .
in these.

(A

His thought is most developed

The former was written first and is divided

into four books.

The first book was written in Paris

and the other three in Italy.

Tradition says that it

was written to assist missionaries in the conversion
of the Moors in Spain but the 'Gentiles' in his work
are more naturalistic philosophers than Islamic
devotees.

"One of Aquinas' aims was to show that the

Christian faith rests on a rational foundation and
that the principles of philosophy do not necessarily
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lead to a view of the world which excludes
Christianity,

. . " (Copelston, 1970, pp. 11-12).

In the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles,
God, he addresses the nature and existence of the

divine.

In the second book, Creation, he grapples

with creation and the nature of the human soul, along
with its relation to the body.

The third (Providence)

and fourth (Salvation) books look at the final end of
humans, the former from a more rational perspective
and the latter with a heavier draw on Christian
doctrine.
Aquinas stated that the Summa Theologica was
written as a systematic summary for theology
students.6

Pegis says it is "a classic synthesis of

Christian thought and represents St. Thomas at his
distinctive best" (1948, p. xii).

History indicates

that it was composed largely in Italy and also while
in his second stay in Paris (1269-1272).
three parts to the Summa and a supplement.

There are
The first

6pegis says the correct title of the work is
either Summa or Summa Theologiae, though tradition
accepts the name Summa Theologica (1948, xii) .
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concerns the subjects of God and creation along with a
discussion of human nature and human intellectual
life.

The second has to do with human moral life, the

first sub-part dealing with general moral themes and
the final end of humanity and the second part
directing attention to specific virtues and vices.
Christ and the sacraments is the topic of the third
part.
Questions on the Soul (Aquinas, 1984) was written
during St. Thomas' return residence in Paris.

Its

doctrinal organization runs parallel to that of the
Summa Theologica.

Translator J. H. Robb says the work

concerns key points on the doctrine of the nature and
constitution of the human being with an awareness of
the Averroistic controversies then erupting at the
University of Paris (pp. 17-19).

The Islamic

philosopher Averroes interpreted the third book of
Aristotle's De Anima as affirming that there is only
one intellect in all humans, all human minds being the
internal modifications of the divine mind (Copelston,
1970, pp. 176-178).
Collections of theological texts compiled by
Gilby, Pegis, and Glenn, provide an introduction to
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Aquinas' works and a filling in of gaps on the topics
covered in this paper.

Glenn's helpful A Tour of the

Summa is a "turnpike trip" through the entire Summa
Theologica, a condensed paraphrase of its essential

teaching.

It includes an index.

As such, A Tour is a

precis strictly dictated by the text but reads like a
brief commentary.
Aquinas

Pegis' Introduction to St. Thomas

is a topical presentation of selected

materials from the basic writings of Aquinas for the
general reader.

It draws from the Summa Theologica

and the Summa Contra Gentiles and includes a good
introduction but no index.
Thomas Gilby has written a companion volume to
his previous one on the philosophical texts of
Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas Theological Texts, which
likewise follows the organizational plan of the Summa
Theologica.

Gilby has intricately woven together

major texts and opuscula (smaller works) of St. Thomas
and cross referenced them with notes and an index.
Where his paraphrase is deemed clearer, it is used
instead of another, though the original is cited.
The commentaries are indispensable for the rich
store of textual, contextual, and theological guidance
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they provide to Aquinas' difficult and profound works.
There is no introductory work finer than that of
Catholic layman G. K. Chesterton's, Aquinas (1956).
Although Chesterton says of it that it is merely "a
popular sketch of a great historical character who
ought to be more popular," Aquinas scholars Pegis and
Gilson highly acclaim it (pp. 12-15).

Its genius is

not in exhaustive treatment of the man and his work
(there is no index) but in incisive comprehensiveness
and literary style within the pages of a small volume.
It presents Aquinas' biographical, philosophical, and
theological insights in a way which compels the
Protestant and modern thinker to rediscover Aquinas as
foundational to Western society.
H. D. Gardeil, O.P. shares the Dominican
tradition with Aquinas.

His work, Introduction to the

Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas:

Psychology,

originally appearing in French as the third in a four
volume set, is the first volume translated into
English.

It is a philosophical psychology, the

doctrine of living being, which is aware of modern
psychological thought.

He follows closely the

arrangement of Aristotle's De Anima and Aquinas'
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commentary on the same.

After tracing the history and

meaning of psychology and the sources of St. Thomas'
psychology, Gardeil defines life and the soul,
vegetative and sensitive life, and the activities and
nature of the intellectual soul.
Father Copleston's Aquinas contains an excellent
introduction to his work and then gives a strictly
philosophical exposition of Aquinas' philosophical and
theological works under the topics of metaphysics,
God, creation, man, and Thomism.

This scholarly yet

accessible work includes a helpful index and
biographical notes.
One of the foremost conservative Thomist
scholars, a member of the Pontifical Academy of Saint
Thomas Aquinas in Rome, Etienne Gilson, has written a
careful religious analysis, The Elements of Christian
Philosophy, illuminating the key theological ideas of
St. Thomas.

Gilson (1963) accepts Pope Leo XIII's

description of "Christian philosophy" as "that way of
philosophizing in which the Christian faith and the
human intellect join forces in a common investigation
of philosophical truth" (p. v).

The stated purpose of

this work is to present Aquinas' key notions and
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doctrinal positions, the essential elements, which are
not always explicitly stated in the discussion of each
particular problem in Aquinas' works but which are
necessary for a complete understanding of St. Thomas'
Christian philosophy.

It contains a subject and

proper name index.
The following abbreviations are used in referring
to Aquinas' writings:

Figure 6.

Abbreviations for Aquinas' writings.

ST

Summa Theologica

Pars Prima

First Part

Ia

Prima Secundae

First Part of Second Part

Ia IIae

Secunda Secundae

Second Part of Second Part

IIa IIae

Pars Tertia

Third Part

IIIa

Supplementum

Supplement

Suppl.

The Summa Theologica is divided into the above
sections and also into questions (q) and articles (a)
within these sections.

Thus, a reference to ST, Ia

IIae, q4, a3 would direct the reader to the Summa
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Theologica, the First Part of the Second Part,

question 4, article 3.
The Summa Contra Gentiles (SG) is divided into
books and chapters so that a reference to SG, 1, 3
would mean the Summa Contra Gentiles, book 1, chapter
3.

The other works are divided into questions and

articles so that a reference to De Potentia, 5, 3
would refer one to De Potentia, question 5, article 3.
The Summa Theologica, Summa Contra Gentiles, and other
works such as De Potentia and De Anima also contain
objections, which are hypothetical arguments which
Aquinas poses against his own and then answers (ad) .
Thus ST, Ia, 97, 2, ad I would mean that the quotation
had been taken from the Summa Theologica, First Part,
question 97, article 2, in the reply to the first
objection.
It should also be noted that Aquinas does not use
inclusive language, using terms like "man" to denote
"humanity."

Though this paper does not change his

words when quoting him, an effort has been made to
employ inclusive language otherwise throughout the
paper.
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His Work
The subjects about which Aquinas has written are
vast and profound.

It is impossible to give an

adequate overview of his work but some of those things
for which he is most well known are here presented
(Helm, 1981, pp. 60, 61).
Aquinas regarded all human knowledge as sensory
in origin, data being derived from matter.

But humans

are able to take this understanding and abstract to
the knowledge of the forms of matter.

This replaced

Augustine's view that intellectual illumination of
form was more certain and reliable than sense
impressions of matter.
together.

Aquinas saw the two working

Much of Aquinas' writing attempts to

explain how this concept, that all knowledge is
sensory in origin, still allows one to know God.
He made a distinction between sacred doctrine and
philosophy, which will be covered in the next section.
He did affirm that God's existence could be proven
philosophically.

His famous "Five Ways," five a

posteriori arguments, are based on God's effects in
the world, data which is accessible to the common
person and not just the metaphysician.

Aquinas says
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God is known through His effects in nature and also in
the revelation of Scripture, of which Aquinas was an
eminent philosophical exigete.

And yet Aquinas

stressed how little and imperfectly God is known, that
He is known only by analogy (i.e., Solomon's wisdom is

like God's wisdom in some ways) and negation (i.e.,
God is not finite).

Analogy is one of Aquinas'

crucial concepts.
He also distinguished between faith, opinion, and
knowledge.

Faith, which is personal and

propositional, is stronger than opinion because it
involves a firm assent to its object.

But faith is

less than knowledge because it lacks full
comprehension.

Religious faith is a disposition which

comes by the grace of God.

Aquinas' ethics stress the

teleological character of human choice, distinguishing
moral theology, which is from divinely revealed law,
and natural law, which is accessible to everyone.
St. Thomas affirms God as the uncreated "first
cause" of all things, excepting evil which is a
privation of goodness.

As such, God is the first and

only principle of reality upon whom all reality is
based and contingent, and with regard to whom all
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other realities are lesser.

Therefore, God knowingly

determines and determinantly knows all things, while
allowing for human freedom and responsibility, in the
eternal present.

The concept of act and potency is

crucial for Aquinas here as in other areas.
By Leo XIII's 1879 encyclical, Roman Catholicism
gave Aquinas' works official, though not exclusive,
place in the Church's thinking.

Protestants have

repudiated some of Aquinas' speculative excesses and
perceived biblical errors yet have affirmed his
efforts in apologetics and philosophical theology.
Some prominent modern Protestant theologians embrace
Aquinas (Geisler, 1982; Vos, 1985).

Method of Aquinas
Writing Style
St. Thomas' writing style fits the philosophical
method he employs.
not pleonastic.
are long.

He is precise not prolix, plain

His words are brief while his works

His style, unlike Augustine, is always

"penny plain rather than twopence coloured"
(Chesterton, 1956, p. 153).

Yet he
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very specially possessed the philosophy that
inspires poetry; as he did so largely inspire
Dante's poetry [which inspired T.

s.

Eliot].

And

poetry without philosophy has only inspiration,
or, in vulgar language, only wind.

He had, so to

speak, the imagination without the imagery.
even this is perhaps too sweeping.

And

(Chesterton,

1956, pp. 152, 153)

The second thing that can be said about his
writing is that it utilizes common sense.
logical, not paradoxical.

He is

Chesterton believes that

practical politics and abstract philosophies of the
modern world which deviate from Aquinas in this way,
do so to their detriment.
Since the modern world began in the sixteenth
century, nobody's system of philosophy has really
corresponded to everybody's sense of reality; to
what, if left to themselves, common men would
call common sense.

Each started with a paradox;

a peculiar point of view demanding the sacrifice
of what they would call a sane point of view.
That is the one thing common to Hobbes and Hegel,
to Kant and Bergson, to Berkeley and William
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James.

A man had to believe something that no

normal man would believe, if it were suddenly
propounded to his simplicity; as that law is
above right, or right is outside reason, or
things are only as we think them, or everything
is relative to a reality that is not there.

The

modern philosopher claims, like a sort of
confidence man, that if once we will grant him
this, the rest will be easy; he will straighten
out the world, if once he is allowed to give this
one twist to the mind.

Thomist philosophy

is nearer than most philosophies to the mind of
the man on the street.

(p. 146, 147)

Philosophical and Theoloqjcal Science
It is difficult if not impossible to separate St.
Thomas' philosophy from his theology because his
purpose was certainly theological and his method
employed the highest of philosophical devices.
his philosophical method will be emphasized.

Here,
Of his

theology, it can be said generally that he held to the
text of the Scriptures as well as the doctrine of the
church of his day as tested by his philosophical
science.
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In his philosophy Aquinas is unashamedly
Aristotelian.

St. Thomas was rigorous in testing his

assumptions, painstaking in his observations of data,
and ruthlessly logical in his analysis and
interpretation of that data.

And he begins, as does

science of today, with the empirical data.

In ST, Ia,

78, 4, ad 4, he declared that everything that is in
the intellect has been in the senses, that the mind
knows only through sense knowledge but it knows more
than sense knowledge (Aquinas, 1981, p. 396).

This is

quite different from those who might take a more
mystical view, such as Plato or some modern
philosophers, who say that the mind is informed from
within.
Aquinas, like Aristotle, used deduction,
believing that true premises produce a true
conclusion.

Logic is based on reality not the other

way around.

He knew that no matter how many inductive

premises are collected from data, deduction must be
employed to reach a conclusion.

There are no

"interpra-facts," no data that explain or interpret
themselves inductively apart from a deduction.
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Chesterton says some moderns believe induction can
replace deduction.
But the process of deduction from the data is the
same for the modern mind as for the medieval
mind; and what is pompously called induction is
simply collecting more of the data.

.

.

But

many modern people talk as if what they call
induction were some magic way of reaching a
conclusion, without using any of those horrid old
syllogisms.

But induction does not lead us to a

conclusion.

Induction only leads us to a

deduction.

.

In this world there is nothing

except a syllogism and a fallacy.

(Chesterton,

1970, pp. 153-155)
What are some of the St. Thomas' assumptions
regarding philosophy?

Aquinas' first principles of

knowledge, or epistemological assumptions, are as
follows:

the principle of identity, the principle of

non-contradiction, the principle of excluded middle,
the principle of causality, and the principle of
finality (Geisler, 1980).
which something follows.

A principle is that from
A cause is that from which

something follows with dependence.

As stated in ST,
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I, 33, 1, a first principle is the first from which
something follows.

The following figure of the first

principles is based on V Metaphysics, lect. 11; I
Sentences, 19, 1, 1; II Sentences, 34, 1, 3; and On
Power, II, 1 (Geisler, 1982) .
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Figure 7.

First principles.

Principle
Identity

Ontological
being is being

Epistemological
being is
intelligible

Non-contradiction

being is

contradictions

not non-being

cannot be
simultaneously
true

Excluded middle

either being or

either

non-being

affirmation
or negation
is true

Causality

every contingent

every contingent

(finite) being

proposition is

is caused by

caused

another

(dependent)
on another

Finality

act communicates

every agent acts

act, or being

for an end

is finalized
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On the origin of first principles,

'what' is

known comes first, then 'how' it is known.

Aquinas'

De Anima, III, 4 states that all knowledge begins in

sensation (Aquinas, 1984, p. 65f).

But ST, Ia, 84, 6,

adl states that there is also a need for an agent
intellect to abstract (Aquinas, 1981, p. 428) .

How is

it that first principles are known from the senses?
By means of agent intellect and natural knowledge.
Natural knowledge is where agent intellect engages in
an unconscious use of the first principles.

It is the

natural capacity of the mind existing without
contents, structure without stuff, before sensation
(Geisler, 1980).
Having defined first principles it is important
to see how Aquinas actually develops theology and
philosophy upon this foundation.

For instance, in XII

Metaphysics, lecture 12, Aquinas posits, "The entire

universe is one dominion and realm, governed by one
ruler, who is the first mover, the first truth, the
first good--God, blessed for ever and ever" (Gilby,
1955, pp. 76, 77).

Thomas Aquinas is well known for
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his method of using philosophy and theology to do his
work.

This paper explores a topic, anthropology, in

which he, of necessity, brings to bear truths from
both philosophy and theology.

How philosophy and

theology articulate and inform each other is explained
in Aquinas' words in the following from De Trinitate,
ii, 3.
The gifts of grace are added to us in order to
enhance the gifts of nature, not to take them
away.

The native light of reason is not

obliterated by the light of faith gratuitously
shed on us.

Hence Christian theology enlists the

help of philosophy and the sciences.

Mere

reasoning, can never discover the truths which
faith perceives; on the other hand, it cannot
discover any disagreement between its own
intrinsically natural truths and those divinely
revealed.

(Gilby, 1955, p. 7)

Thus Aquinas sets philosophy (and science) and
theology beside each other as complementary
disciplines not contradictory.

The "gifts of grace"

known through theology enhance the "gifts of nature"
known through philosophy and science.
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He goes on, in De Trinitate, ii, 3, to describe
and delimit the domains of theology and philosophy
(including science) .

"The principles of reason are

the foundations of philosophy, the principles of faith
are the foundation of Christian theology . . .
Nature is the prelude to grace.

It is the abuse of

science and philosophy which provokes statements
against faith"

(Gilby, 1955, p. 7).

Aquinas then gives three uses for philosophy in
theology:

for proving religious presuppositions, for

showing analogies between the realms of
science/philosophy and religion, and for defending the
faith.
Accordingly Christian theology may call on
philosophy to perform three offices.
demonstrate the groundwork of faith,

First, to
for the

truths of natural religion--for instance, that
God exists, that there is one God, and so forth-can be proved by philosophy and are presupposed
to religious belief and are necessary elements in
the science of faith, or Christian theology.
Secondly, to declare analogies common to nature
and grace; thus Augustine draws illustrations of
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the Trinity from philosophical teachings.
Thirdly, to resist attacks on faith, by showing
that they are either wrongly conceived or at
least unsupported and cannot be pressed.

(Gilby,

1955, p. 7, 8)
Gardeil (1959) expresses Aquinas' doctrine of
knowledge (epistemology) and the connection between
empirical science and metaphysics in part as follows:
This doctrine, to be sure, appeals in some
measure to experience and observation.

Indeed,

it begins with knowledge as a fact of experience;
but the experience is studied in its most general
aspects and in terms of a metaphysics of being,
especially of natural, that is, bodily being,
which is the constant point of reference.
It may be granted, then, that such a study
holds out small attraction for anyone who intends
at all costs to keep his inquiry on the empirical
level.

But if we want to probe beneath the

surface, and if we have any curiosity at all as
to the inner nature of knowledge, then we must
come to the task prepared with metaphysical
tools.

Such a course is the more imperative
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when, with the feeble light of human
understanding, we try to penetrate the world of
the spirits, whether of our own, which we can but
faintly discern, or of God and the angels, which
is wholly beyond our direct view.

Before we can

have some understanding of the workings of the
spirit world, our notions from sense must be set
to a metaphysical key; it is here above all, in
this metaphysical transposition, that the
principles of knowledge supplied by our former
masters prove their truest and most abiding
worth.

(pp. 102, 103)

Copelston (1970) compares the method of
metaphysical science to the apprehension of the
everyday world.
It is not that the metaphysician discovers a new
fact . . .

in the way that an explorer may

discover a hitherto unknown island or flower:
is rather that he makes explicit what is
implicitly contained in our apprehension of
actual things.

[Metaphysical understanding]

cannot be equivalent to a privileged mystical
experience on the part of metaphysicians, a

it
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conception which Aquinas certainly did not admit.
Nor can it be equivalent to the communication of
a piece of factual information to a select few.
It would presumably be more akin to seeing
something familiar 'for the first time' or 'in a
new light. '

(pp. 103, 104)

Anthropology

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines

anthropology as, 1. the science of man and "2.
teaching about the origin, nature, and destiny of man
especially from the perspective of his relation to
God" (1973, p. 49).

It is this second definition to

which we turn our attention.

This paper defines

anthropology as the theological and philosophical
study of the person.

The Greek word "anthropos" is

the word which denotes "mankind," or better rendered
"humankind," and does not refer to the gender "male"
but to the race "human."
What is a person?

In ST, Ia, 29, 3, Aquinas says

"Person signifies what is noblest in nature, namely a
complete substance of an intellectual kind,

"
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(Aquinas, 1981, pp. 157, 158).

And in ST, Ia, 29, 4,

"Person [italics original] in general means an
individual substance which is intelligent, individual,
that is, single in itself and distinct from others.
But human person also implies this body of flesh and
bones and this soul .

"(Aquinas, 1981, p. 158,

159.
G. K. Chesterton (1970) says that St. Thomas is
foremost an anthropologist.

Homo Sapiens [italics original] can only be
considered in relation to Sapientia [italics
original]; and only a book like that of St.
Thomas is really devoted to the intrinsic idea of

Sapientia [italics original].

.

In this

sense St. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps more than he is
anything else, is a great anthropologist.

(pp.

159, 160)
Anthropology is the topic addressed in the second part
of this chapter.
In this chapter, the following three parts on
anthropology present Aquinas' view of what a person is
(nature), how a person is put together (manner), and
why there is a problem for the person (reason) .
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Webster's first definition of "nature" is "the
inherent character or basic constitution of a person
or thing: essence" (1973, p. 766).

By "manner" is

meant the way or method, according to Webster, in
which a person is structured (Webster, 1973, p. 700).
"Reason" is defined by Webster as "a statement offered
in explanation or justification" (1973, p. 962).

The

first part, then, discusses the person's nature in
terms of the image of God, the second speaks of the
manner in which a person is a soul/body unity, and the
third shows the reason for there being a problem, that
of separation from God.

Wbat is a Person--Nature?
Introduction to the Person as Relational
For Aquinas, intellect, the ability to know, is
the highest of all the abilities possessed by
humanity.

Here he affirms that the highest use of

this highest ability is in relationship with God.
Aquinas states in the first paragraph of the first
chapter of his work on salvation in Summa Contra
Gentiles that "man's perfect good is that he somehow
know God" (Aquinas, 1975b, p. 35).

His chapter
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expands on this theme with the ways that God has given
humans to know Him, ways that God has given "out of a
superabundant goodness, therefore, so that man might
have a firmer knowledge of Him,
1975b, p. 36).

" (Aquinas,

He states in the Summa Contra

Gentiles, book three, 120, 10, on providence that

"man's ultimate felicity consists solely in the
enjoyment of Him" (Aquinas, 1975a, p. 136).
Aquinas begins his prologue to the first part of
the second part of the Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae,
prologue, by affirming that man is made to the image
of God, Homo ad imaginem Dei factus, that "the
ultimate explanation of our being lies in its being
kindred with God" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 583).

The

familial analogy, calling it "kindred," is here called
upon to describe this relationship with God.

And this

fact of relationship, he declares, is the absolute
explication of what it means to be human.
In Marquette University Professor James Robb's
(1984) translation of Questions on the Soul, or De
Anima, he begins by saying, "I dedicate this volume to

my friends and to my students, who are also friends,
since it is from them that I have over the years
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learned and continue to learn that if through wisdom
we can be united to God in friendship, then it is also
true that through deep and continuing friendships we
may make progress in our pursuit of wisdom"
(dedicatory leaf) .

Robb asserts that, "Aquinas treats

human beings as incarnate spirits, spiritual beings
who, incarnate in the world of space and time, are
constantly transcending the limits of nature through
knowledge, love and friendship"
dedicatory leaf).

(Aquinas, 1984,

For St. Thomas and Thomists alike,

the use of the person's highest human ability,
intellect, in having a relationship with God and
others is the ultimate essence of being human.
Relationship defines a person's existence, it
constitutes who one is.
Image of God as Relational
That the human person is like the divine person
is revealed in Genesis 1:26 where God says, "Let Us
make man in our image, according to Our likeness;
n

Augustine, Bonaventure, and Aquinas base their

anthropology on this verse.

Before delving into the

image one should know something about the original.
It is important to know more about God.

Aquinas says,
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in ST, Ia, 30, 1, that "Person [italics original] in
God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine
nature" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 160-161).

Before this

sentence, in ST, Ia, 29, 4, he makes some supporting
statements about the relationship with the trinity and
the nature of God.
To inquire into the meaning of personality in
general is one question, to inquire into the
meaning of divine personality is another.

Person

[italics original] in general means an individual
substance which is intelligent, individual, that
is, single in itself and distinct from others.
But human person also implies this body of flesh
and bones and this soul:

these are the

individuating principles for men, but not for
every kind of person.
Now distinctions in God arise from relations
of origin.

A relation in God is not, as it is

with us, an accident modifying a subject, but the
divine nature itself, and existing as a complete
substance.

As Deity is God, so divine fatherhood

is the Father.

Divine personality, then,

signifies a relation existing as a complete
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substance.

Thus a relation is denoted, which is

a substance, a hypostasis subsisting in, and
really identical with the divine nature.
(Aquinas, 1981, p. 157-160)
This last sentence equates the nature of God with
the relationship existing in the trinity.

Here, the

very nature of God is seen as relational.

This is

consistent with the Scriptural phrase which God spoke
in the plural referring to Himself, "Let Us make man
in our image, according to Our likeness;

"

(.Ille.

Open Bible, 1979, p. 2).
Having briefly looked at the divine nature, what
does it mean for a human to be the image of God?
Aquinas says humans are the image of God in two ways,
reflecting God's divine nature, especially in
intelligence, and the trinity of Persons in God,
especially in being relational.

In De Veritate, X, 2,

ad 5, he says, "Mind is made to the image of God when
he is mindful of him and bearing him; mind is present
to itself and to God before it is roused by ideas
taken from sense" (Gilby, 1955, p. 166).

Aquinas

usually explains each of these two ways in terms of
relationship, usually familial.
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Other passages from St. Thomas deal with this
subject (cf. ST, Ia, 93, 4).

The following is from

Sentences, III, 10, 2, 2, 3.
Man is made to the image of God, because he is
created with an intelligence.

Only intelligent

beings are said to be made to his image; they
only can be called his sons, and can be adopted
through grace.

Adoption goes further, for a

right to the inheritance is implied.

God's

heritage is his own happiness, of which only
intelligent creatures are capable, though they
have no strict title to it from the fact of their
creation; such happiness is a gift, the gift of
the Spirit.
enough:

Sharing of possessions is not

there must be a sharing of the heritage.

And so the adoption of creatures means their
communion in divine happiness.
Christ should not be termed God's son by
adoption, for he is begotten eternally by the
Father, and his divine nature has the heritage by
right, not by additional concession:

"all things

whatsoever that the Father has are mine" [John
16:15).

(Gilby, 1955, pp. 155, 156)
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In the above quote, a human's intelligence and
ability to relate to God as adopted children
constitute being the image of God.

That this adoption

means "their communion in divine happiness"
underscores the relationship aspect of this image.
The trinity is alluded to in the last paragraph of the
quote.

It highlights the similarity and difference

humanity has with Christ in the relationship within
the trinity of the Father and Christ.

The similarity

is that each is a child of God, while the difference
is that Christ is a natural child and humans are
adopted.

Each is afforded full privileges of

sonship/daughterhood up to the full measure of his/her
nature, Christ being infinite and humans being finite.
The following is from the Summa Theologica,
33, 3.

Ia,

It carries the theme of the relationship in

the trinity as that which humans are, that which is
the image of God.
A term is primarily attributed to a subject which
possesses its full meaning, not something else
which bears some resemblance:
comes back to what is owned.

what is borrowed
Lion primarily

means the animal, not a lionheart or any other
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sort of human lion.

Now fatherhood and sonship

at full strength are the Father's and the Son's
who are one in nature and glory.

Creatures are

not related to God with the utmost sonship,
because they and the creator are not of the same
nature.
Nevertheless there are varying degrees of
resemblance, and the more perfect a thing the
closer it is to divine sonship.

God is called

the father of non-rational creatures because they
are like his footprints; they resemble him
because they are his traces:

"Hath rain a

father? Or who hath begotten the drops of dew?"
[Job 38:28)

Rational creatures are like him

because they are his images:

"Is not he thy

father that hath possessed thee?

Hath he not

created and established thee" [Deuteronomy 32:6)?
Of some he is father by likeness of grace, for
they are called adopted sons because born of
grace:

"The Spirit himself beareth witness with

our spirit that we are the children of God, and
if children, then heirs also" [Romans 8:16, 17].
And of others by a greater likeness, for they
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have entered into their inheritance of glory:
"We rejoice in hope of the glory of God" [Romans
5: 2] .

Perfect fatherhood, then, is a relation of
Person to Person, and thence it is derived to
include God's relationship to creatures.
(Aquinas, 1981, pp. 174, 175)
In each of the above comparisons of God to
creation, family relationships are called upon as
analogy.

Aquinas is saying, by the consistent use of

the relational references in every one of the
Scripture citations above, that these relational
concepts are more than analogies used for
illustration.

They indicate ontological truth,

reality about the nature of human beings as
relational, rooted in the very nature of God as a
triune relation.

It is fitting then that human

nature, as the image of God, would be so described.
That humans are the image of God by being
relational becomes more difficult to understand when
one considers the physical part of a person, the body,
as opposed to the soul.
like God?

Is it only the soul that is

How do the soul and body relate?

If humans
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are relational, how are they put together for relating
to themselves, the world, and God?

This is the

purview of the next section.

How is a Person put together for Relationship--the
Manner?
Introduction
How the soul and body relate to each other is
important because it affects one's view of how humans
have relationship.

There are two possible extreme

views of how the body and soul relate to each other.
One is to say that the 'real' human is the soul which
inhabits the body, the body being either an instrument
or a prisoner of the soul.
and is the view of Plato.
soul to the body.

This is known as dualism
The other is to reduce the

This is known as monism and is the

view of atomists, materialists, and some
epiphenomenalists.
One can say in general that those philosophers
who have concentrated their attention on the
higher psychic activities and on man's religious
and moral life have inclined to some form of
dualism, while those who have paid special
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attention to the dependence of psychic processes
on physical conditions have inclined to a
monistic interpretation of the relation of soul
to body.

(Copelston, 1970, pp. 157, 158)

Is there then a truth which strikes a middle course
between the extremes?

Yes, and St. Thomas proposes

such a one, combining principles from Aristotelian
psychology and Christian theology.
Soul-Bod:t Unity
For Aquinas, as stated in ST, Ia, 75, 1,

'soul'

is equivalent to Aristotle's 'psyche,' and is "the
first principle of life in living things about us"
(Aquinas, 1981, pp. 363, 364).

G. K. Chesterton, in

describing Aquinas' view of what a person is, states
that
For him the point is always that Man is not a
balloon going up into the sky, nor a mole
burrowing merely in the earth; but rather a thing
like a tree, whose roots are fed from the earth,
while its highest branches seem to rise almost to
the stars.

(1970, p. 164)

Aquinas himself says in De Spiritualibus Creaturis, 3,
ad 2,
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An excellent form brings all and more than lesser

forms can provide.

Matter is as richly endowed

by a higher form as by a lower; in addition it
also becomes the proper subject of complementary
perfection.

Thus our body is both a

physiological and a psychological object, is both
organic and charged with human interests and
values.

(Gilby, 1955, p. 96)

Aquinas' foundational use of Aristotle is clearly
seen in his formulation of the unity of body and soul.
Aristotle solved the dilemma by formulating a middle
ground between materialism and dualism.
If, as Aristotle was convinced, the materialism
of the ancients was unable to explain the
distinctive characteristics that living things
display both in their structure and activity, and
if, as he was equally convinced, Platonic dualism
sundered the unity of these beings to the point
of no repair, clearly, then, what was needed was
to find a new and more comprehensive
interpretation, one that would account for all
the facts at hand.

Accordingly, Aristotle has

recourse to the doctrine of hylomorphism,
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declaring the soul to be neither more nor less
than the form of the body.

With that, the

dilemma between materialism and dualism
collapses.

(Gardeil, 1959, p. 35)

That the soul of a person is the "form of the
body" is the great philosophical and theological
understanding to which Aquinas subscribes.

It is a

short four word phrase of deep and inestimable aid in
defining humanity.

Beyond the scope of this paper

would be an account of the many attempts made in
history to explain the relationship between the soul
and body.

What Aquinas has accomplished is a marriage

of the rational and the revealed concerning the makeup
of a person.

That the soul is the form of the body is

but the first of his contributions simply stated.

St.

Thomas sums up Aristotle's argument on the definition
of the soul, in Aristotle, De Anima, II, lect. 1, no.
221, as follows.
Since, then, substance may be taken in three
ways, namely, as composite, matter, and form and
since the soul is neither the composite, which is
the body having life, nor matter, which is the
body as the subject of life, we are compelled by
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the logic of division to say that the soul is
substance in the manner of form, being the form
of a particular kind of body, namely, of a
physical body having life in potency.

(Gardeil,

1959, p. 33)
First, the soul is "the first act (or form) of a
physical (natural) organic body having life in
potency," says Aristotle in De Anima, II, lect. 1, no.
221 (Gardeil, 1959, p. 33).

Second, Aristotle says in

De Anima, II, lect. 2, no. 273, that the soul may be
defined as the principle of its activities, the soul
is "the first principle by which we live, sense, move,
and understand" (Gardeil, 1959, p. 34).
Aquinas' De Anima, 1, ad 1, deals supremely with
the question of the soul-body unity.

He says that

Plato, with whom Aquinas disagrees,
holds that a soul not only subsists per se but
even that it possesses in itself the fullness of
a specific nature.

For he held that the full

nature of the species is in the soul, defining a
human being not as something composed of soul and
body but as a soul using a body, and thus the
relation of the soul to its body is that of a
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sailor to his ship or of a clothed man to his
garments.

However this position cannot be

maintained; for it is clear that that by which
the body lives is its soul.
"to be" of living things.

Now to live is the
Therefore the soul is

that by which a human body actually exists; but
to confer being is a characteristic of a form.
Therefore, a human soul is the form of its body.
(Aquinas, 1984, p. 47)
He carries this analogy further by saying that
when a body is dead, a corpse, no longer living
(separated from the soul), it no longer carries on its
specific nature, that is, the eye no longer sees.
This shows that there is a stronger connection between
soul and body than sailor and ship.

When the sailor

leaves the ship, the ship does not suffer corruption.
But when the soul leaves the body, the body suffers
corruption such that human nature is incomplete.

"For

a thing is not complete in nature unless it possesses
those things which are demanded for the proper
operation of its nature"

(Aquinas, 1984, p. 48) .

Therefore, one must maintain that the soul is an
entity, as being able to subsist per se [italics

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations
110

original] but not as possessing in itself a
complete specific nature, but rather as
completing human nature insofar as it is the form
of its body; and thus at one and the same time it
is a form and an entity (Aquinas, 1984, p. 47).
Aquinas shows that "from the operation of the
human soul the mode of existence can be known"
(Aquinas, 1984, p. 48).

This means that now the soul

operates says much about its makeup, about what it is,
about its existence.

That is to say, the object of

its actions characterizes those actions and explains
the nature of the subject.

This is seen in the

hierarchy of various forms of matter.

The essential

operation of various forms lower than persons gives a
clue as to the principle employed by that form.

The

higher the form, the more it is like and approximates
higher principles.
For instance, elements are the lowest forms and
those closest to matter.

Their operations only go so

far as general active and passive qualities.

The next

higher form operates with higher principles.

These

are compounds which, over and above the abilities of
elements, have operations derived from the celestial

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations
111

bodies, such as magnets attract iron.

And this is not

due to an accidental quality or state such as heat or
cold but due to the nature of the compound's form
itself, that of participating in celestial power.

The

following is a chart derived from Aquinas' discussion
on this topic.

It lists the form in ascending order,

lower to higher, along with its characteristic
operation and principle.

Important to note is that

each succeeding form possesses the operation and
principle of the ones before it.
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Figure 8.

Hierarchy of various forms of matter.

Form

Operation

Principle

element

compactness

active/passive qualities

compound magnetism

celestial power

plants

moving

like celestial body movers

animals

knowing (mater.)

like substance of movers

human

knowing (immater.)

like substance of angels

What is the meaning of this?

Perhaps crudely it may

be said that "if it walks and quacks like a duck, it
is a duck," or "a tree is known by its fruit."

A

thing is known by what it does, a form is known by its
operation according to its inherent principle.
Aquinas sums up in the following way.
Thus in such a fashion from the operation of the
human soul the mode of its very existence can be
known.

For insofar as a soul possesses an

operation which transcends material things, its
very existence is raised above and does not
depend on its body.

But insofar as a soul by

nature acquires its immaterial knowledge from
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what is material, it is clear that the
fulfillment of its nature cannot be achieved
apart from union with a body.

For a thing is not

complete in nature unless it possesses those
things which are demanded for the proper
operation of that nature.

In this way,

therefore, a human soul insofar as it is united
to its body as its form still possesses an act of
existence which is elevated above the body and
does not depend on it; clearly then this soul is
constituted on the boundary line between
corporeal and separate substances.

(Aquinas,

1984, p. 48)
As stated in this section above, St. Thomas'
incorporation of Aristotle's "the soul is the form of
the body" is but the first of his contributions to the
discussion.

To this philosophical position he adds a

very important theological understanding.

He declares

that the soul is not only the form of the body but is
also capable of existence without the body--it is
immortal.
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Wby is there a Problem in Relationship--the Reason?
Introduction
Aquinas says, II de Malo,

II, that sin is what

obstructs one's relationship with God; "Sin is like an
obstacle interposed between the soul and God:

your

iniquities have separated between you and God [italics
original]

[Isaiah 59:2]" (Gilby, 1955, p. 139).

The

Isaiah passage goes on to say "And your sins have
hidden His face from you, so that He does not hear"
(The Open BibJe, 1979, p. 678).
In ST, IIa, IIae, 94, 1-3, Aquinas asserts that,
on the part of the sin itself, idolatry is the most
grievous sin, idolatry belonging to superstition,
which is "to exceed the due mode of divine worship,
and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given
to whom it should not be given" (Aquinas, 1981, p.
1589-1592; Gilby, 1955, p. 143).

In ST, IIIa, 3, ad

1, he says, "Man fell back to earth by deserting God"
(Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592; Gilby, 1955, p. 143)
Separation and Fragmentation Caused by Sin
Aquinas says, in ST, IIIa, I, ad 3, that
"sinfulness abandons the art of divine wisdom and the
plan of divine goodness" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 3003).

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations
115

In, IV de Malo, 2, Aquinas speaks of sin as a "turning
away from" and a "turning to:"
The human quality of the motions of hands and
eyes is communicated by the will, and it is thus
that physiological and psychological processes
are invested with morality.

Gestures reveal what

the will is like; if it be disordered, then it
produces a corresponding outside effect and
impression.

We commit a sinful act by turning to

a temporal attraction without being duly directed
to our last end.
eternal blessing.

In effect we turn away from
There is a turning to, and a

turning away; the first, the self-indulgence and
the wasteful love, represents the material
element in sin; the second, the aversion and the
hate, represents the formal element, formal
because morality is defined with reference to our
last end.

The sin of our first parents

contained these two elements, the formal element
of turning away from God, and the material
element of turning to vanity.

We may draw

an analogy with actual and personal sin:

there

the turning away from God is formal, and the
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turning to creatures is material.

Likewise

original sin; it estranges us from God, and
commits us to this world.

(Gilby, 1955, p. 124)

That people turn from God to vanity, he says in
IV de Malo, ad I, i, is both natural and unnatural for
humans.
Natural to man [italics original] has a double
ring, natural to animal--and so we can desire
anything attractive to our senses; and natural to
human--and so we desire pleasure according to the
measure set by reason:

thus the concupiscence

which is ready to scrap reasonableness for what
takes our fancy is against human nature .

.

(Gilby, 1955, p. 126).
Thus, in ST, Ia IIae, 71, 1, he says sin is
against rational human nature.

He also states that

sin is against the natural divine order of things.
"Sin, the direct opposite of an act of virtue, is a
disordered activity; vice, the direct opposite of
virtue, is the condition of a thing out of its proper
natural bearings" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 897).
Based on the fact that sin is against the natural
order of things, Aquinas goes on to note, in ST, Ia
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IIae, 72, 1, that sin tends toward a split in the
person, a disunity and chaos rather than unity and
coherence.
A good man's purposes are unified, a sinner's
scattered.

Virtues make us bent on pursing the

reasonable life; prudence links them together in
a common plan of rightful activity.
then converge.

All purposes

Not so with sinful intentions.

For the sinner does not set himself to depart
from the rules of reasonable living.

He sets out

to indulge himself with something that attracts
him, and it is this which gives a positive tone
to what he does.

Variegated are the attractions

for whose sake he is ready to turn away from
right reason; there is no essential combination
between them, one with another, indeed sometimes
they are conflicting.

Since they stamp specific

character on sins it follows that sins are not
all in alliance together.

The life of sin is a

fall from coherence to chaos; the life of virtue
a climb from the many to the One.
p. 902,

903)

(Aquinas, 1981,
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This exchanging of worship of the one and only
first principle of reality, God, for worship of
multiple lesser realities separates humans from the
holy, uncreated God and joins them in an unholy
alliance to created beings.
Separation and Fragmentation Caused by the Sin of
Idolatry
In ST, Ila, IIae, 94, 1-3, Aquinas says idolatry
is the most grievous sin, idolatry belonging to
superstition, which is "to exceed the due mode of
divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine
worship is given to whom it should not be given"
(Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592).

Aquinas stated that

divine worship should only be given to whom it should
be given.

Thus, he said in I Sentences, I. iii, c.,

ad 3, 4, created things, animals, man, angels, images,
and so forth should not be worshiped because only the
creator should be worshiped.

"In themselves creatures

are no obstacles to eternal happiness.

We make them

so, by abusing them and by committing ourselves to
them as if they were our ultimate goal" (Gilby, 1955,
p. 130).
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Book three of the Summa Contra Gentiles, 120, 2325 says the following:
Therefore, it is clear from what we have said
that the cult of latria [that is, giving ultimate
worship] is due to the one, highest God only.
Thus it is said in Exodus (22:20):

"He that

sacrif iceth to the gods shall be put to death,
save only to the Lord;" and in Deuteronomy
(6:13):

"Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and

shalt serve Hirn only."

And in Romans (1:22-23)

it is said of the Gentiles:

"For, professing

themselves to be wise, they became fools, and
they changed the glory of the incorruptible God
into the likeness of the image of a corruptible
man and of birds, and of fourfooted beasts and of
creeping things;" and later (verse 25; Douay
modified) :

"Who changed the truth of God into a

lie and worshiped and served the creature rather
than the Creator, Who is God above all blessed
for ever."

So, since it is unfitting for the

cult of latria to be offered to any other being
than the first principle of things, and since to
incite to unworthy deeds can only be the work of
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a badly disposed rational creature, it is evident
that men have been solicited by the urging of
demons to develop the aforesaid unworthy cults,
and these demons have been presented in place of
God as objects of men's worship because they
craved divine honor.
Psalm (95:5):

Hence it is said in the

"All the gods of the Gentiles are

devils;" and in I Corinthians (10:20):

"the

things which the heathens sacrifice, they
sacrifice to devils and not to God."

Therefore,

since this is the chief intent of divine law:
that man be subject to God and that he should
offer special reverence to Him, not merely in his
heart, but also orally and by bodily works, so
first of all, in Exodus 20, where the divine law
is promulgated, the cult of many gods is
forbidden when it is said:

"Thou shalt not have

strange gods before me" and "thou shalt not make
to thyself a graven thing, nor any likeness."
(Aquinas, 1975a, p. 140, 141)
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Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced Thomas Aquinas' work, his
method, and his groundbreaking formulations on
anthropology.

Three aspects of anthropology were

discussed, that persons are relational by virtue of
their being the image of God, that the soul and body
are unitary, and that the great problem of humankind
is separation from God, especially through idolatry.
The next chapter synthesizes integrative issues
of Aquinas' theological discipline of anthropology and
Fairbairn's psychological discipline of personality
theory.

After a comparison of their work, further

suggestions are offered on maintaining a dialogue
between theology and psychology toward an integrative
paradigm.
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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS TOWARD A DIALOGUE

Introduction

The author's plan in this paper has been to begin
a dialogue between psychoanalytic object relations
psychology and Western Orthodox Christian theology,
with Fairbairn representing British object relations
theory and Aquinas representing Western Orthodox
Christianity.

In the first chapter, the stage was set

by sharpening the focus, discussing the method, and
defining the scope and thesis of this paper.

An

analysis of W. R. D. Fairbairn's writings constituted
the second chapter of the paper, followed by an
analysis of the relevant data from the theology of
Thomas Aquinas in the third chapter.
From the exposition in chapters two and three, a
common principle emerged from the writings of each
man.

This principle acts as a unifying theme for both

domains, psychology and theology, and is the subject
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of this last chapter.

It is the author's intent in

this chapter to build on what has been found to be
implicit in Fairbairn and Aquinas thus far.
this unifying theme?

What is

It is the primacy of

relationship.

Reyiew of Chapters Two and Three
The plan of Chapters Two and Three followed the
same format.

The following figure illustrates that

each chapter was divided into two parts, an
introduction and the study of the person, with subpoints under each.
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Figure 9.

Overview of Chapters Two and Three.
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In the introduction, each man's work was highlighted,
through a literature review and brief overview of his
thought, followed by discussion of each theorist's
method, "psychoanalytic science" for Fairbairn and

"philosophy and theology" for Aquinas.
In the second part of each chapter, the study of
the person, "personality theory" for Fairbairn and
"anthropology" for Aquinas, was approached by posing
three questions.

The first question,

"What is a

person?," investigated the nature of a person.

The

answer for Fairbairn is that a person is relationship
seeking and for Aquinas is that a person is made in
the image of God, which is relational.

The second

question, "How is a person made?," investigated the
manner in which a person is put together.

For

Fairbairn, the answer is the pristine, unitary ego,
while Aquinas affirms the soul/body unity.

The third

question, "Why is there problem?," investigated the
reason a person has a problem.

Fairbairn's answer is

splitting of the ego and Aquinas' is separation and
idolatry.
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Preview of this Chapter
First, an exposition is made on Fairbairn's use
of the sacred and Aquinas' use of the secular.
Second, a comparative analysis of the work of
Fairbairn and Aquinas is set forth.

The Sacred in Fairbairn and the Secular in Aquinas

In Chapter Three, in the section on method, it
was demonstrated the great extent to which Aquinas
went to integrate the secular and sacred.

He stated

that "the gifts of grace are added to us in order to
enhance the gifts of nature, not to take them away.
. Hence Christian theology enlists the help of
philosophy and the sciences" (Gilby, 1955, p. 7).
Having previously established Aquinas as an
integrator of the sacred and secular in his own right,
it is the task here to demonstrate Fairbairn's secular
work as containing a core of theological integration.
If each man is found to be an integrator of the sacred
and secular within his own work, then it would seem
reasonable that, taken together, there would be more
points available for comparison.
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Fairbairn's exposure and adherence to
Christianity are well documented.

As a boy he

attended church with his parents every Sunday, both
morning and evening.

He seemed to prefer Episcopalian

services to Presbyterian.

Sutherland (1989) makes

mention of young Ronald's "practical Christianity,"
citing his work in clubs and organizations serving the
deprived parts of the community.

"That his marked

altruistic and religious feelings were merged with his
whole upbringing is clear

." (p. 5).

By age 18, Fairbairn had decided to become a
clergyman, as the journal entry on his 21st birthday
indicates.

Fairbairn mentions he is not the humble

servant only of King George, "but also of Jesus
Christ."

Fairbairn writes in his personal journal,

"True Christianity ought to satisfy every legitimate
instinct and aspiration.

It ought to be a working and

workable philosophy of life for man and boy, matron
and maiden; it ought to be adaptable to the condition
of schoolroom and football field, of off ice and golfcourse, of factory and home

I have decided to

devote my life to the cause of religion; but may it be
a manly, healthy, whole-hearted strong religion,
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appealing to enthusiasm of youth as well as the
quiescence of old age -- in other words may it be a
Christlike religion" (Sutherland, 1989, pp. 6, 7).
Shortly thereafter, Fairbairn pursued Hellenistic
studies before taking a degree in divinity at London
University.

World War I took him to Jerusalem, where

his varied reading resulted in a newfound interest in
medical psychology.

By the time he returned home his

earlier plans, involving vocational ministry, had
changed.

In January, 1919, he commenced a four-year

training program in medicine, intending to become a
psychotherapist upon completion.
By year two of his program, Fairbairn began
reading Freud and Jung.

Concurrently, he initiated a

personal analysis with an E. H. Connell, whom
Sutherland (1989) describes as "a very full-blooded
Christian" (p. 7).

An analysis with Ernest Jones

followed, ensuring that, as he began seeing his own
patients, Fairbairn would be well-entrenched in
classical Freudian orthodoxy.
While Sutherland (1989) describes Fairbairn's
change of career as abandoning the church (p. 12),
there is no evidence that Fairbairn's interest and
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commitment to religion diminished simply because he
pursued an alternate livelihood.

One can see that

Fairbairn considered the two disciplines not as
mutually exclusive, but complementary.

In fact,

Sutherland (1989) says that "one matter he never
raised was his continuing religious convictions.
Though forsaking the career of a clergyman, he had
remained a regular churchgoer, especially to its main
festivals"

(p. 31).

His theological experience,

integrated in such a fashion as to be reflected in
behavior, had no small effect on his theory and
practice.
In his 1955 paper, Fairbairn discussed the
patient who seeks psychotherapeutic help.

What that

person seeks is "not so much health as salvation from
his past, from bondage to his (internal) bad objects,
from the burden of guilt, and from spiritual death.
His search thus corresponds in detail to the religious
quest" (p. 155-6).

Fairbairn's 1927 paper on the

religious fantasies of a female patient shows his
acceptance of a normal religious experience as well as
a neurotic one.

This further demonstrates that
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Fairbairn's theological, or sacred, beliefs were
inherent in his emphasis on relationship.

Comparative Analysis of Fairbairn and Aquinas

In this first section, a schematic of the major
parallels in Fairbairn and Aquinas is provided.

In

the second section, a comparative analysis is made of
each man's literary and scientific method and of each
one's contribution to the study of the person.

In the

third section, based on the comparison of the work of
Fairbairn and Aquinas, implications and suggestions
for further research are given.

Parallels Diagrammed
Figure 9, reproduced here from the introduction
to this chapter, notes the parallels between the
thought of Fairbairn and that of Aquinas as presented
in Chapters Two and Three respectively.
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Fi~ure

9.
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In this section of Chapter Four, the topics identified
in the above figure serve as an outline for comparing
the views of the two men, beginning with each
theorist's method.

Then the topic of the person is

broached, comparing Fairbairn and Aquinas' answers to
the questions of what a person is, how she/he is made,
and why there is a problem.

Method of Fairbairn and Aquinas
Each was precise and plain in writing.

Each had

a dedication to systematic analysis of detail.
was trained in philosophy and theology.

Each

These

qualities assure that their sacred and secular
assumptions and interpretation of data are well
thought through according to the integrity of their
method and the congruity of their professional
disciplines.

This is especially true of their study

of the person, a topic which so necessarily
intertwines secular and sacred, objectivity and
subjectivity, corporeal and spiritual.
They were both scientists of rigorous discipline,
dedicating their lives to the art of spinning theory
from existential substance; that is, from experience.
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The data they used was experience itself, perceived
through the senses--for Aquinas, everyday experience;
and for Fairbairn, clinical psychotherapy.

Aquinas

employed analogy in explaining his theory, bridging
the gap between concrete and abstract.

Fairbairn used

case examples to demonstrate the connection of data
with theory.
Each has been criticized by modern readers for
not having given enough clarifying examples.

Aquinas'

writings were described as having "imagination without
imagery"

(Chesterton, 1956, p. 152).

Fairbairn's

writing style has been seen as abstract and
systematized (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 153).
Aquinas was exhaustive in his approach, seemingly
attempting to "tie up all loose ends," but without
equal clarity on every point.

Fairbairn was more

general in his coverage, leaving some implications to
further interpretation and elaboration, and thus
leaving some lack of clarity on issues.

If their

writings are heavy on theory, it is not because they
were light on data collection, but because of their
abstract writing style and the complexity of their
subject matter--humanity.
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Their style is part of the meaning, the medium
part of the message.

Scientific scrutiny of the data,

analyzed and reassessed, is the process resulting in
distillation into theoretical formulation.

Aquinas

and Fairbairn allow the reader in on the process of
inquiry, thus documenting the legitimacy of their
method, yet therefore sometimes taking away from the
simplicity of direct explanation.
Aquinas and Fairbairn each drew from tradition in
both sacred and secular realms as well as from newer
ideas, including their own discoveries.

Fairbairn

drew on the tradition of Freud, but also incorporated
the newer theories of Klein, and combined this with
his own clinical observations.

Aquinas drew on the

church fathers and Scripture, yet infused their
thinking with the philosophy of Aristotle, and added
his own logical analysis of experience.

In so doing,

each man forged an amalgam never before manufactured
and which has demonstrated a strength and durability
to stand the test of time.
Perhaps the key element common to both Fairbairn
and Aquinas is their dedication to truth, the
adherence to reality.

This represents a philosophical
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presupposition, an assumption to scientific practice
which is brought to the data and found in the warp and
woof of inductive and deductive data interpretation.
That they agree on this matter is an important
principle to the assertion that the two separate
theorists may be integrated together.

It also has

implications as to how each one in himself integrated
the secular and the sacred.
Each theorist started with the empirical data,
inductively, and then moved to interpretation,
deductively.

But the goal in all of this was the

discovery of reality, the way things are, not the
spinning of intriguing philosophical ideas.

Fairbairn

said that science provides a picture of reality by way
of an intellectual construct (deduction) of various
phenomena (induction)

(Fairbairn, 1958, p. 376).

Aquinas said that everything in the intellect has been
in the senses, the mind knowing only through sense
knowledge (induction) but knowing more than sense
knowledge (deduction)

(Aquinas, 1981, p. 396).

Each

man set the notions of sense to a metaphysical key.
Each man strove to explain reality through
logical reasoning.

Aquinas said that logic is based
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on reality, not the other way around (Chesterton,
1956, pp. 153-155).

Fairbairn said that object

relations theory corresponds more closely with the
psychological data and possesses more explanatory
value from a purely scientific point of view than
Freud's psychology (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 377).
That each man was dedicated to the adherence to
truth through the discovery of reality is also evident
in their view of the human person.

Fairbairn believed

that the reality of external, not internal,
relationships is the optimum for all persons.

Aquinas

believed that relationship with God, the first
principle of reality, is the goal for all persons.
More will be said of this in the following paragraphs.
What is clear is that each man, employing his
method as writer, philosopher, scientist, and
practitioner, was breaking new ground which would
serve as the foundation for later work on the human
person as a theological and psychological being.

In

the following section, the author compares their
studies of the person for the purpose of showing the
compatibility and synergy of each in formulating an
integrated secular/sacred concept of the person.
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The Person as seen by Fairbairn and Aquinas
Fairbairn's personality theory and Aquinas'
anthropology each explain the person in a strikingly
similar way.

Central to each view is the primacy of

the relational nature of human beings.
strongly upheld by both theorists.

This is

For Fairbairn,

this is the point which distinguished him from his
predecessors.

It is his hallmark.

For Aquinas, what

he held was not new on this issue, but the way he held
and explained it was; that is, his non-Augustinian
view of the unity of body and soul and his view of the
compatibility of science and religion.
Each man was committed to linking with the
orthodox tradition of his field, Freud for Fairbairn
and the church fathers and Scripture for Aquinas.
each drew from theorists whose works had not been
applied in the way he applied them.

Fairbairn

utilized Klein's work and Aquinas leaned heavily on
Aristotle.

Each man also carried tradition and the

theories of others to new heights with his own
assumptions, data, and interpretations.

Yet
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Implicit in their unique theoretical additions
were each man's own secular and sacred resources.

It

is on the topic of the human person that these
scientists focused their psychological and theological
integrative powers.

And taken together, their efforts

are even more significant toward providing an
integrative dialogue for understanding the person.

In

the following analysis, the author looks at the three
questions defining this study of the person.

The

first two questions, the nature (what) and manner
(how), are covered briefly, while the third question,
the reason (why) is elaborated on more fully.
Wbat is a Person--the Nature?
Both theorists see the nature of a person as
relationally based.

Fairbairn says that relationship

is the substance of human living and that "psychology
may be said to resolve itself into a study of the
relationships of the individual to his objects .
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60).

.

Aquinas says that "the

ultimate explanation of our being lies in its being
kindred with God" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 583).
That relationship defines not only the normal
behavior but also the very nature of the person is

"
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made even more clear in Fairbairn's statement that one
cannot develop a self or selfhood without being in
relation with others.

Aquinas roots the nature of the

person as being the very image of God, a God whose
trinitarian nature is itself relational.
How is a Person put together--the Manner?
As Fairbairn's view of the relationship of the
psyche and body disengaged him from Freudian hydraulic
tradition, so Aquinas' concept of the relationship
between soul and body distinguished him from the
Augustinian Christian tradition.

Each theorist,

opposing his respective tradition, saw the
psychological aspects (psyche or soul) and
physiological aspects (body) working in harmony,
unity.
There are two extremes on either side of the
argument for the unity of the psychological and
physiological.

Monism, held by materialists, reduces

the psychological to the physiologi9al.

This is the

Freudian view against which Fairbairn fought.

The

other extreme is dualism, held by Platonists, which
sees the "real" human as being only the soul, which
inhabits the body, the body being the soul's
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instrument, or prison.

This is the Augustinian view

against which Aquinas fought.
Fairbairn affirms both aspects of the person
operating in unity, stating that "the pristine
personality of the child consists of a unitary dynamic
ego" (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 375).
In a word [biological]

'impulses' cannot be

considered apart from the endopsychic structures
[of the ego] which they energized and the object
relationships which they enable these structures
to establish .

No 'impulses' can be regarded

as existing in the absence of an ego structure,
it will no longer be possible to preserve any
psychological distinction between the id and the
ego.

(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 85, 88)

Likewise, Aquinas holds to the co-working of
psyche and soma.

"Thus our body is both a

physiological and a psychological object, is both
organic and charged with human interests and values"
(Gilby, 1955, p. 96).
How does this impact the concept of the person as
relational?

Fairbairn makes it clear that the

impulses which drive human interaction are not
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impersonal but personal.

Aquinas makes clear that a

person can relate to God with his/her whole self, not
being ashamed of the body as if it were evil as some
ascetics would say.

This gives dignity and worth to

the human condition, psyche and soma, as unified in
making contact, relationship with others, including
God.
WhY is there a Problem--the Reason?
Fairbairn and Aquinas alike see the reason for
the problem of a person as separation from real
relationship and turning to less real ones.

For

Fairbairn, this translates into the infant's turning
from relationship with real, external care givers to
relationship with less real, internal object
representations of these care givers, which the child
creates through ego splitting, in an attempt to
maintain a controlled relationship with them on
her/his own terms.

This separation from real,

external relationship causes a split in the person's
self, a fracturing of the self due to a less real,
internal configuration of relational loyalties.
Because the person is essentially in need of real,
external relationship, this does not work, and the
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person ends up manifesting maladaptive psychological
symptoms.
For Aquinas, it is the turning of the individual
away from relationship with the real, external God,
the one and only first principle of reality, to
relationship with less real, idolatrous
representations supplanting God in an attempt to
continue a controlled relationship with Him on her/his
own terms.

This separation from the first principle

of reality, upon which all reality is contingent,
results in a fracturing of the person into unholy
relational alliance with created things rather than
the Creator of being.

Because the person is

essentially in need of relationship with the external,
first principle of reality, God, this does not work
and the person ends up manifesting maladaptive
spiritual symptoms.
Fairbairn sees the apogee of psychological health
and functioning in the despair of the schizoid
personality.

This is the person who is almost

completely given over to relationship with less real,
internal objects instead of real, external objects.
The epitome is the solitary person.

However, there
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are others with seemingly higher functioning who,
despite their external, social facade, are actually
operating intrapsychically at a schizoid level.
Fairbairn says the schizoid position is a tragic
situation and is a theme of much literature,
especially tragedy and poetry.

He alludes to the

"Lucy" poems of Wordsworth as providing an example
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 25).

In one of these poems,

entitled "Lucy Gray; or Solitude," a little girl,
lovely to all appearances but actually quite lonely,
is finally lost from her parents after a snow storm.
The first two and the last two stanzas read as
follows.
Oft I had heard of Lucy Gray:
And, when I crossed the wild,
· I chanced to see at break of day
The solitary child.

No mate, no comrade Lucy knew;
She dwelt on a wide moor,
--The sweetest thing that ever grew
Beside a human door!

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations
144

[Lucy is then lost in the snow]

--Yet some maintain that to this day
She is a living child;
That you may see sweet Lucy Gray
Upon the lonesome wild.

O'er rough and smooth she trips along,
And never looks behind;
And sings a solitary song
That whistles in the wind.

(Wordsworth, 1973, pp.

135, 136)
Fairbairn sees this as painting the picture of
the tragic despair of a schizoid person, a person so
caught up in her inner world that she ends up losing
touch with her parents and her outer world, never
growing emotionally beyond childhood, only, and for
all time, singing a "solitary song that whistles in
the wind."

This is the height of psychological

illness for Fairbairn, a kind of psychological death,
complete separation from real relationship and being a
prisoner of the internal, less real relationships of
the split self.
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Aquinas also sees separation from real
relationship and commitment to less real, idolatrous
relationships as the most tragic.

For him, it is

separation from the one and only first principle of
reality, God, which is the most horrible consequence
of sin.

In ST, IIIa, 3, 1, ad 4, he states:

Now it [sin] is hurtful to him [a person who has
sinned] chiefly because it separates him from
God; and in this respect the separation from God
which is a punishment, should be more displeasing
than the sin itself .

. .

Consequently, since

this is the greatest hurt, inasmuch as it
consists in privation of the greatest good, the
greatest of all punishments will be separation
from God.

(Aquinas, 1981, p. 2568)

Physical death is the soul being separated from the
body but spiritual death is the soul being separated
from God, who is the first principle of reality.

For

Fairbairn, the self being separated from relationships
in reality, with real persons, is like a psychological
death.
Aquinas says, in ST, IIa, IIae,

94, 1-3, that

idolatry is the most grievous sin, idolatry belonging

Psychoanalytic Object-Relations
146

to superstition, which means "to exceed the due mode
of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when
divine worship is given to whom it should not be
given" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592) .

For Aquinas

this includes exchanging the truth of God for a lie,
worshiping creatures instead of the Creator.

Whether

it be animal, man, demons, devil, or symbols like
idols, it is all said to be idolatry (Aquinas, 1975a,
pp. 140, 141).

Yet, he is clear that creatures in

themselves are not obstacles to one's communion with
God.

In I Sentences, I. iii, c., 3, 4, he says,

"We

make them so, by abusing them and by committing
ourselves to them as if they were our ultimate goal"
(Gilby, 1955, p. 130).

Thus, idolatry is the exchange

of worshiping the first principle of reality, which is
God, for the lie which is worshiping of lesser
realities as if they were the ultimate.
Fairbairn speaks of the person as internalizing
bad objects to control them yet therefore losing real
relationship with external objects; making a pact with
the devil as an ersatz father at the expense of true,
external parental relationship; succumbing to
"possession," as if by evil spirits, by internal bad
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objects in place of external objects (Fairbairn,
1952a, pp. 67, 70, 71).

Fairbairn says that "sin" is

always "regarded, according to the Hebraic conception,
as seeking after strange gods, and according to the
Christian conception, as yielding to the Devil .
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 74).

"

Here Fairbairn speaks in

terms of idolatry, seeking after gods or the Devil
instead of seeking after God.
This again emphasizes his idea of selling one's
relationships in the external world in exchange for
relationships with the gods, or Devil, of the internal
world.

Aquinas would say the person sells

relationship with God for relationship with gods,
idols, or the Devil, any created thing versus the
Creator, any lesser reality than the first and only
principle of reality, which is God.

Fairbairn rarely

employs as powerful an image to drive home his point
as he does when he states, "for it may be said of all
psychoneurotic and psychotic patients that, if a True
Mass is being celebrated in the chancel, a Black Mass
is being celebrated in the crypt" (Fairbairn, 1952a,
p. 70).
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Here one can clearly see the striking parallels
in the thought of Aquinas and Fairbairn.

Aquinas says

that sin separates a person from God by turning the
person from the first principle of reality to a lesser
reality.

Fairbairn says that turning from dealing

with reality of external objects is the costly price
paid for turning to internal objects, and that the
person needs the psychotherapist to be a kind of
priest for "'the forgiveness of sins'" (Fairbairn,
1952a, p. 70).

Aquinas says that idolatry, as a part

of superstition, is the most grievous sin, giving
devotion to whom or what it is not due.

Fairbairn

says the person's devotion to the idols of internal
objects and the person's subsequent "possession" by
them necessitates the psychotherapist being "the true
successor to the exorcist . . .

[concerned with]

'the

casting out of devils'" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70).
Fairbairn's concept of psychopathology and
Aquinas' concept of sin are seen here as quite related
and complementary.

Each believes that turning from

real relationship and turning to less real
relationship is against the nature of the person,
separating the person from reality, splitting one in
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one's devotion, and thus causing detrimental
psychological, or spiritual, consequences.

Implications and Suggestions for Further Research
A major benefit of research on a topic as complex
as developing an integrative dialogue is the potential
created for making implications and proposing further
research.

The preceding section compared Fairbairn

and Aquinas' view of the person using three questions
as an outline, the nature (what) of a person, the
manner (how) in which a person is made, and the reason
(why) there is a problem.

Based on the above

comparison of Fairbairn and Aquinas' study of the
person, the author here utilizes the same three
questions to raise implications and suggest research
possibilities.
Wbat is a Person--the Nature?
Fairbairn's view that one cannot develop a self
or selfhood without being in relation with others
raises the question of gender and gender identity
formation.

Is it necessary to have both same sex and

opposite sex care givers in order to develop a sense
of self?

Does particular pathology result from the
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lack of relationship with same sex or opposite sex
care givers?

Moberly would answer each in the

affirmative.

She says that, ideally, each child

should have same sex and opposite sex attachment
figures to relate to and that the absence of specific
attachment figures may result in long-term damage to
the child's capacity for attachment (Moberly, 1983, p.

79).

Her discussion of Bowlby's comment on the

detachment from and "disidentification" with mother
argues for the importance of the gender of care givers
in the formation of gender identity (Moberly, 1983,
pp. 10, 60) .
Another aspect of the topic of identity is
humankind's link with God.

Aquinas roots the nature

of the person as being the very image of God, a God
whose trinitarian nature is itself relational.
Further research outside the western tradition would
be enlightening.

Eastern Orthodox theology has much

to say on the trinitarian nature of God and how the
Christian reflects that relational nature.
The Christian God is not just a unit but a union,
not just unity but community.

All, then,

that is implied in our limited understanding of
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the human person and of human love, this we
affirm also of God the Trinity, while adding that
in him these things mean infinitely more than we
can ever imagine.

.

The final end of the

spiritual Way [sic] is that we humans should also
become part of this Trinitarian coherence or
perichoresis [italics original], being wholly
taken up into the circle of love that exists
within God.

So Christ prayed to his Father on

the night before his Crucifixion: "May they all
be one:

as thou, Father, art in me, and I in

thee, so may they also be one in us"
17:21).

(John

(Ware, 1990, pp. 33, 35, 34)

An interesting implication to the foregoing views

of Fairbairn and Aquinas can now be presented.

Since

Fairbairn says that a person needs relationship with
other human persons to form a self and Aquinas says
that a person is by nature the image of a relational
God and should relate to that God, can a person
develop a self without being in relationship with God?
The Western Orthodox theological answer to any
question about the ability of a human person to exist
or function without God is that people are finite and
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thus contingent on the infinite God--a person cannot
be or do anything without God.

By virtue of one's

very existence, a person has a relationship with God,
acknowledged or not.

A person's very nature is rooted

in God ontologically.
But the epistemological question remains.

If a

person chooses not to cultivate that relationship,
chooses not to relate to or "get to know" God, can a
self be attained?

This author believes that the

answer is yes and no, that the answer theologically is
parallel to the development of the child
psychologically.

To have life at birth, the child

need not know the full extent of the relationship with
the mother.

The child can relate to her as a part

object and ascribe goodness or badness to her through
undifferentiated splitting and projection.

The mother

must be good-enough regardless of the perspective of
the child.

But to have health past the early period,

the child must develop enough to relate to the mother
and others as whole objects and to separate and
individuate from the mother and others in order to
relate truly at a mature level.
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Likewise, in one's relationship to God, to have
life or existence at birth, the person need not know
the full extent of the relationship with the God in
whose nature one is created.

A person can relate to

God as a part object and ascribe goodness or badness
to God through undifferentiated splitting and
projection.

God must be good-enough regardless of the

perspective of the person.

But to have health past

the early period, the person must develop enough to
relate to God and others as whole objects and to
separate and individuate himself/herself from God and
others in order to relate truly at a mature level.
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether
a person can fully develop a self without maturely
relating to God is similar to the question of whether
a person can fully develop a self without maturely
relating to mother and others--it is a matter of
degree, a matter of maturity.

The more developed self

is that of the person who is more maturely relating to
others,

including mother and God.

And how one

relates to mother impacts how one relates to God and
vice versa--mature relating to God assumes mature
relating to others, such as mother.

This is seen in
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the Christian Scripture and tradition that love of God
must include love of human persons (Matthew 22: 37-40;
1 John 2: 9, 10; 1 John 4: 19-21).

Therefore, one

cannot have a fully developed self if one is not
relating maturely to real objects, whether these be
mother and others (human persons) or God (divine
persons) .
That which constitutes mature relating to God is
perhaps open to more subjectivity than a description
of human relating.

Yet the principle of relating well

is constant whether it be with human or divine
persons.

The one who claims mature relationship with

God is still subject to these principles.

Further

research here could focus on the exact nature of a
mature relationship to each kind of object, divine and
human, and how each impacts the other.
How is a Person put together--the Manner?
Against the reductionistic extremes of monism and
dualism, Fairbairn and Aquinas affirm the working
together of the psyche and soma.

For Fairbairn, no

biological impulses are regarded as existing in the
absence of an ego structure.

For Aquinas, the

person's body is both organic and charged with human
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interests and values.

This gives dignity and worth to

the human condition, psyche and soma, as unified in
making contact and relating with others, including
God.
After all, Christ himself took on a human body,
lived a sinless life, and developed a perfectly mature
self.

And the very purpose of his life and death was

to make relationships better for all creation--between
God and humans and between humans and humans as well
as between humans and the rest of creation (John 3:
16, 17; John 15; John 17).

This was all accomplished

when the Divine took on a human body.

Certainly,

mature relationships can be accomplished as a
psyche/soma unity.
This points to the question of just how biology
and psychology work together in daily life to relate
maturely to God.

How does one relate to God without

the extreme uses of the body found in hedonism or
asceticism?

Are there implications for how the two

genders relate to God based on biology?
role of sexuality?

What is the

If these ways of relating are

"hard wired in," can they be changed?

The answer to
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these questions is beyond the scope of this paper but
they would seem fruitful for further research.
In some ways the answers to these may be likened
to the mysteries described in physics, such as light
being,

at the same time and in the same way, both

wave and particle.

The analysis of the working

together of psyche and soma may be like those
processes which produce music, working together of
left brain and right brain, linear and conceptual
processing, words (psyche) and rhythm (body) .

The

mysteries of theology and psychology take their place
alongside those of the "hard sciences."

Each can and

should be explored and yet each opens up the
unexplored.

Such is the state of human understanding

on the interrelationship of the human psyche and soma.

Wby is there a Problem--the Reason?
Fairbairn and Aquinas alike see the reason for a
person's problem as separation from real relationship
and turning to less real ones.

For Fairbairn, the

self being separated from relationships in reality,
with real persons, is like a psychological death.

For

Aquinas, it is separation from the one and only first
principle of reality, God, which is the most horrible
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consequence of sin.

Physical death is the soul being

separated from the body but spiritual death is the
soul being separated from God, who is the first
principle of reality.
What is the connection between physical death and
emotional (psychological) or spiritual (theological)
death?

There are indications that lonely people do

not live as long as others.

It is known that people

die physically shortly after anniversaries or
holidays. These would seem to indicate a connection
between emotional death and physical death.

In

healthy individuals, physical separation should
resolve into psychological separation.

Chronic

depression can sometimes be seen as unresolved grief,
the unwillingness to let someone or something go.
Physiologically, how does psychological death
precipitate physical death?

Can spiritual death cause

psychological or physical death?

What is the

relationship between psychological and spiritual
death?

These questions warrant further research.

Another point of comparison between the two
theorists could be further explored.

Fairbairn's

concept of psychopathology and Aquinas' concept of sin
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are seen as quite related and complementary.

Each

believes that turning from real relationship and
turning to less real relationship is against the
nature of the person, separating the person from
reality, splitting oneself in one's devotion, and thus
causing detrimental psychological, or spiritual,
consequences.

Aquinas says that sin separates a

person from God by turning from the first principle of
reality to a lesser reality.

Fairbairn says that

turning from dealing with reality of external objects
is the costly price paid for turning to internal
objects, and that the person needs the psychotherapist
to be a kind of priest for "'the forgiveness of sins'"
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70).
What is the source of the sin or pathology?

It

would seem that the "turning away" from the reality of
real relationship is the root of the pathology or sin.
The person, through one's own volition, is the source
of the pathology or sin.

Just what is the

relationship between Fairbairn's concept of
psychopathology and Aquinas' concept of sin?

This

author is saying that healthy relationship is the
issue for both theorists and only the object of that
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relationship is different.

For Fairbairn, the object

is other humans, particularly mother.

For Aquinas,

the object is God.
In John 8:32, Christ said, "You shall know the
truth, and the truth shall make you free"
Bible, 1979, p. 1023).

(The O.pen

This would apply to freedom

from internal objects as well as from idols and it
comes when the truth, or reality, of real relationship
is known.

For Fairbairn, the liberating truth is

knowing, or relating to, the person in the external
world of reality.

For Aquinas, the liberating truth

is to know, or relate to, the God of reality,
particularly Christ, who is truth personified.

Christ

said, in John 14:6, "I am the way, and the truth, and
the life; no one comes to the Father but through Me
(The Open Bible, 1979, p. 1031).
It may be simplistic to say that relating to
humans deals with the psychological while relating to
God deals with the theological.

This is because

inherent in relating to God are healthy relationships
with humans.

Therefore, the theological subsumes the

psychological as a category.

This is not to suggest a

rigid hierarchy of object relationships necessary to
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the development of the self, that is, first mother,
then father, then God, but rather a complex and subtle
interplay.

Perhaps human objects are necessary, but

not sufficient, transitional objects to God.

And

perhaps relationship with God informs one's
relationships with others, the explicit context of
relating to God being the context of relating with
others.

It would be interesting research to see what

is the normal pattern in human subjects for the
development of this mutually informing, accommodation
and assimilation, figure and ground interplay.
Boston College professor John McDargh, S.J.,
states the case of this interplay well in his
published Harvard doctoral dissertation.
A colleague of mine challenged me with the
question:

"Are you trying to say that God is

nothing but a cosmic teddy bear?"

"No," I

replied, "but I am arguing that we cannot
understand fully what compels human beings to
seek after that which they name 'God' until and
unless we understand something about our
relationship to our teddy bears." (McDargh,
xiii)

1983,
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Much has been made in this paper of the reason
for there being a problem, the sin or pathology in a
person.

Further integrative dialogue could be done on

Fairbairn and Aquinas' view of the solution to the
problem, or what is curative, what restores health to
the person.

This would be a direct complement to this

present paper.
Integration of psychology and theology would be
furthered still if the questions on the study of the
person were posed to more representatives from
psychology and theology.

This would provide a broader

comparison and application.

Also, as seen in the poem

quoted in this chapter, vistas in English literature
are open for further research, for finding
psychological and theological truth in literary works.
There is much to be explored in the way of data and
analysis in this continuing integrative dialogue.
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Conclusion

From the exposition in Chapters Two and Three, a
common principle emerged from the writings of W. R. D.
Fairbairn and Thomas Aquinas--the primacy of
relationship.

This principle served as a unifying

theme for both domains, psychology and theology, and
was the subject of this last chapter.
In this chapter, the author noted Fairbairn's use
of the sacred and Aquinas' use of the secular,
compared the work of both theorists, and set forth
implications and suggestions for further research.

In

this way, the material in the preceding chapters
served as a foundation for this integrative dialogue.
This dissertation asserted that the concept of
relationship is the key to a psychoanalytic objectrelations theoretical and Thomistic theological
understanding of the human personality.

Second, it

suggested that this concept of relationship may serve
as an integration point between psychology and
theology.
It was seen that these theorist/practitioners
share a common scientific and philosophical method
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dedicated to the discovery of reality under God.

Each

believed that a person's nature is relationally based.
Both believed that the person is a psyche and soma, a
psychological and biological, unity.

Each believed

that turning from real relationship and turning to
less real relationship is against the nature of the
person, separating the person from reality, splitting
one in one's devotion, and thus causing detrimental
psychological, or spiritual, consequences.
New York University theoretical psychologist Paul
Vitz sets down a challenge for further work in the
area of integration.

"It may be a good time for

Christianity quietly to work out an intellectual
rapprochement between its own spiritual psychology and
genuine psychoanalytic insights" (Vitz, 1977, p. 13).
In part, this paper is a response to that challenge.
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